AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE:
A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

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Strategy

by

LUIS CARLOS FALCÃO ESCORREGA, MAJOR, PORTUGUESE ARMY
B.S., Academia Militar, Lisboa, Portugal, 1994

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In recent years, global players such as the United States, the European Union (EU) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have noted Africa's growing strategic importance to their respective interests. Among those interests is the increasing importance of Africa's natural resources particularly oil, agricultural raw materials, and mineral resources, but also growing concerns over other peace and security threats such as conflicts, terrorism, cross-border crimes, cyber threats, or piracy. African Union (AU) Member States are developing an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to address all these types of threats.

This study is a descriptive study in the realm of strategy, focused on creating a holistic and meaningful picture about the mechanisms and purpose of the APSA. The overall intent of this study is to analyze the mechanisms developed, or in a developing stage, by the AU and regional organizations to address peace and security issues in the Africa, with the ultimate goal of contributing to a better understanding of African security context at the strategic level. By using the strategic model of Ends-Ways-Means, this study concluded that the APSA is a viable security strategy to deal with the principal threats in Africa. However, there are still important shortcomings and its effectiveness is dependent upon three critical ingredients: political will of AU Member States, developments at the regional level, and by addressing the external threats much more consistently, covering the security dimension of the APSA in the same extent of its peace dimension.

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Name of Candidate: Major Luis Carlos Falcão Escorrega

Thesis Title: African Peace and Security Architecture: A Strategic Analysis

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Gary R. Hanson, M.B.A.

_____, Member
James B. Martin, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Michael J. Burke, M.Ed.

Accepted this 16th day of December 2011 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, by Major Luis Carlos Falcão Escorrega, 103 pages.

In recent years, global players such as the United States, the European Union (EU) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have noted Africa's growing strategic importance to their respective interests. Among those interests is the increasing importance of Africa's natural resources particularly oil, agricultural raw materials, and mineral resources, but also growing concerns over other peace and security threats such as conflicts, terrorism, cross-border crimes, cyber threats, or piracy. African Union (AU) Member States are developing an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to address all these types of threats.

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By using the strategic model of Ends-Ways-Means, this study concluded that the APSA is a viable security strategy to deal with the principal threats in Africa. However, there are still important shortcomings and its effectiveness is dependent upon three critical ingredients: political will of AU Member States, developments at the regional level, and by addressing the external threats much more consistently, covering the security dimension of the APSA in the same extent of its peace dimension.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ACRONYMS

AMANI	African Military Exercise
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISEC	African Union Electoral Support Mission in Comoros
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CADSP	Common African Defense and Security Policy
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CMD	Conflict Management Division
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPX	Command Post Exercise
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
EAC	East African Community
EASBRICOM	Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FOC	Full Operation Capability

FPU	Formed Police Unit
FTX	Field Training Exercise
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit [German Agency for Technical Cooperation]
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IOC	Initial Operational Capability
MAPEX	Map Exercise
MLD	Military Logistics Depot
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NARC	North African Regional Capability
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PKF	Peace Keeping Force
PLANELM	Planning Element
PQ	Primary Question
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
PW	Panel of the Wise
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RDC	Rapid Deployment Capability
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RMs	Regional Mechanisms
SADC	Southern African Development Community

SCA	Strategic Conflict Assessment
SQ	Secondary Question
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNDPKO	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

<u>Background</u>

In recent years, global players such as the United States, the European Union

(EU) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have noted Africa's growing strategic

importance to their respective interests. Among those interests is the increasing

importance of Africa's natural resources particularly oil, agricultural raw materials, and

mineral resources, but also growing concerns over violent extremist activities.

Additionally, other potential threats such as maritime piracy, illicit drug and people

trafficking, armed conflicts, humanitarian crises and epidemic diseases remain security

challenges for Africans and the International Community (Ploch 2011).

The increasing strategic importance of Africa is accompanied by the economic

growth of most African countries. Many sub-Saharan African countries, assumed as the

poorest in the world, recorded economic growth rates between five and six percent per

year in the last decade by adapting to the global economy; primarily by increasing

exports and attracting foreign direct investment capital. Additionally, Africa is recovering

from the global financial crisis faster than expected, demonstrating that African economic

growth has accelerated and may continue at historically high rates (Cilliers, Hughes, and

Moyer 2011, x). However, security issues--some of them rooted in the past--continue to

hinder a desired sustainable development.

The end of the Cold War and major international failures in the 1990s to respond

to humanitarian disasters (such as the genocide in Rwanda, the civil war in Sudan, and

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the United Nations operations in Somalia)[1] led to the disengagement of great powers

from African conflicts. They preferred to confine themselves to a more humanitarian

role[2] and to encourage African solutions for African conflicts. In addition, by the 1990s,

the former African continental organization, the Organization of African Unity (OAU),

lost much of its credibility. The OAU was accused of indifference, bureaucratic paralysis,

being a club of dictators disconnected from reality, and being too preoccupied with "lofty

political ideals and declarations, which bore little resemblance to the challenges posed by

extreme poverty, conflict, or the respect of human rights in vast areas of Africa" (Engel,

and Porto 2010, 1). With the withdrawal of military, political, and financial support by

great powers, the failure of UN efforts, and the inefficiency of the OAU, the trend toward

regionalization of internal conflicts has accelerated (Besada, Goetz, and Werner 2010, 1).

One of the major obstacles for African peace and development after the end of the

Cold War was, and still is, the proliferation of armed conflicts, both inter-state and intra-

state. Throughout these years the roots and typology of those conflicts has changed as a

result of political and social alterations.

After the end of the Cold War, it seemed that Africa would enter into a new era of

"Afro-optimism" (Safaneta 2004), with the end of the civil wars inherited from the Cold

War and with almost all military and dictatorial regimes undertaking electoral processes

(Safaneta 2004). However, the lack of political capability and democratic culture

contributed to subsequent social problems and unrest, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.

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[1]Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).

[2]Safeguarding, however, their interests through military presence. In realm of military cooperation or peacekeeping missions, superpowers like U.S., China and France have a significant military presence in Africa (Escorrega 2010).

This led to a weakening of the States, to the emergence of alternative forms of power (such as *Warlords*), and to ethnical conflicts across national borders (Escorrega 2010). The drama of the Great Lakes region in the mid 1990s tragically highlights this new reality, with millions of deaths and huge waves of displaced populations. Somalia, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sierra Leone are part of a long list of countries where the political and social instability evolved rapidly bringing back the war to Africa. It was not until 2002 that the world witnessed the start of some peace processes, like the one between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and the ones in Sudan or Angola. It was, however, a period of fragile peace, with a very slow pace in the peace processes and several setbacks (Safaneta 2004). Since then, there has been a decline in the number of violent armed conflicts in Africa, with some intra-state conflicts enduring, like the recent case of Libya.

Other security threats loom in the African continent; from conventional challenges such as insurgencies, resource and identity conflicts, and post-conflict stabilization to growing threats from piracy, narcotics trafficking, violent extremism, and organized crime, among others (Africa Center for Strategic Studies). In this strategic environment, African people have been looking for African solutions to their own security problems, and are developing a continental security system within the context of the African Union (AU).

The security architecture in Africa has evolved considerably over the past forty years. In the past, regional and sub-regional African organizations expended most of their time dealing with the aftermath of conflicts instead of prevention and early resolution. The creation of the African Union in 2002 was the most significant step towards

achieving a continental collective security system, enabling African countries to unite in seeking and developing collective solutions to prevent and mitigate conflicts. The AU rejected the approach of its predecessor (the OAU)--of absolute respect for national sovereignty--and adopted a new policy in which the responsibility to protect human and people's rights, and the right to intervene in a Member State are enshrined in the Constitutive Act, the basis of the new security architecture[3] (Vines and Middleton 2008, 8).

The Constitutive Act established provisions for intervention in the internal affairs of a Member State through military force, if necessary, to protect vulnerable populations from human rights abuses. Implicit in these provisions is the concept of human security and the understanding that sovereignty is conditional and defined in terms of a State's capacity and willingness to protect its citizens (Powell 2005, 1). In order to provide an operational dimension to the security provisions of the Constitutive Act, the AU developed capacities for early warning, quick reaction, conflict prevention, management and resolution. At the same time, it placed "itself within a robust security system that builds on the strengths of African regional organizations and the United Nations (UN), and that draws on extensive support from other international actors" (Powell 2005, 1).

This new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) pursues African solutions to African problems. The APSA is grounded on two pillars: the Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP)[4] and the Peace and Security Council (PSC)[5] (see

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[3]The first reference to this concept is in the Protocol that established the Peace and Security Council of the AU, in 2002, in his Article 16, naming it the "overall security architecture of the Union."

[4]AU's central policy document on security, signed in 2004.

figure 1). To fulfill its tasks, the PSC has three primary instruments at its disposal: the

Panel of the Wise (PW), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the African

Standby Force (ASF). These three instruments, together with a special fund for financing

missions and activities related to peace and security (the Peace Fund) and the Regional

Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, round out the

elements of the APSA.

Figure 1.   The African Peace and Security Architecture
Source: Created by author.

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[5]AU's most important organ on security issues.

The African Union is the institutional center of gravity of the APSA. For a better understanding of its role it is useful to set out briefly the current institutional framework. The *Assembly of Heads of State and Government* (from now on referred as the Assembly) is the supreme organ of the AU; it is composed of Heads of State and Government or their duly accredited representatives. The *Executive Council* is composed of ministers, usually foreign affairs ministers, designated by the Governments of Members States and is responsible to the Assembly. There is also the *Permanent Representatives' Committee*, composed of permanent representatives of Member States accredited to the Union, charged with the responsibility of preparing the work of the Executive Council.

The administration and executive branch of the AU is the *AU Commission* (from now on referred as the Commission). It is composed of the Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson, eight Commissioners and Staff members; each Commissioner is responsible for a portfolio,[6] covering different areas of the AU activity.

The Pan-African Parliament ensures the full participation of African peoples in governance, development and economic integration of the Continent. At present, it exercises only advisory and consultative powers, but it intends to evolve into an institution with full legislative powers, with members elected by universal adult suffrage,

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[6]The eight portfolios of the Commission are: Peace and Security (conflict prevention, management and resolution, and combating terrorism); Political Affairs (human rights, democracy, good governance, electoral institutions, civil society organizations, humanitarian affairs, refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons); Infrastructure and energy (energy, transport, communications, infrastructure and tourism); Social affairs (health, children, drug control, population, migration, labour and employment, sports and culture); Human resources, science and technology (education, information technology communication, youth, human resources, science and technology); Trade and industry (trade, industry, customs and immigration matters); Rural economy and agriculture (rural economy, agriculture and food security, livestock, environment, water and natural resources and desertification); Economic affairs (economic integration, monetary affairs, private sector development, investment and resource mobilization) (AU 2011b).

like in the EU. There are also financial institutions (the African Central Bank; the African

Monetary Fund; and the African Investment Bank), the Economic and Social and

Cultural Council and the PSC. As indicated on the AU's Web site, a Court of Justice of

the Union shall be established, that will serve as a veritable Criminal Court for the

Continent.

Primary and Secondary Research Questions

This thesis will be focused to answer the primary question (PQ): To what extent is

the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) a viable security strategy to deal

with the principal threats in Africa?

To address the primary research question, the following secondary questions (SQ)

also require answering: What are the main security objectives of the African Union,

within its African Peace and Security Architecture? How do the different mechanisms of

APSA articulate and develop themselves to achieve its objectives? How can the APSA

contribute to the mitigation of threats in Africa?

Delimitations

Due to time and space constraints, the analysis of the various mechanisms of the

APSA will focus on the continental level, i.e., of the African Union. Analysis at the

regional level (namely in each of the Regional Economic Communities-RECs) will be

included only if necessary for clarity and understanding of the different mechanisms.

Significance

This study is a descriptive study in the realm of strategy, focused on creating a

holistic and meaningful picture about the mechanisms and purpose of the APSA. The

literature about the topic is extensive, but not in a strategic perspective applying the "Ends-Ways-Means" model. The intent of this study is to analyze the mechanisms developed, or in a developing stage, by the AU and regional organizations to address peace and security issues in the African continent, with the ultimate goal of contributing to a better understanding of African security context at the strategic level.

<u>Chapter Outline</u>

This chapter provides the historical background and context necessary for understanding the subject of the thesis and presents the research questions, delimitations and significance of this study.

Chapter 2, "Literature Review," is a survey and discussion of the significant literature about the APSA and it is organized in two steps. First, it reviews the most relevant literature about the topic, focusing on two books published in 2010 and some articles and monographs; second, it reviews thematically the official documents of the AU related to the APSA, by its main mechanisms.

Chapter 3, "Research Methodology," presents the methodology used to collect the data required to answer the research questions and explains the methodology used to analyze the data collected and formulate the conclusions.

Chapter 4, "Findings and Analysis," begins by describing and analyzing the suitability of the Ends established for the APSA, particularly the extent of its contribution for the accomplishment of the desired effect of promoting and consolidating peace and security on the African continent. Posteriorly it describes and analyzes the application of the four classic strategic Ways--diplomatic, military, informational and economic--to the particular case of the APSA, as well as its respective Means. Ways and respective Means

are analyzed together to scrutinize its overall feasibility, i.e., the extent in which the

Ways can be accomplished by its Means.

Chapter 5, "Conclusions and Recommendations," summarizes the conclusions

and present recommendations drawn from the research.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The current state of publications about emerging security architecture in Africa is increasing. There are still few books addressing the topic, but the number of published papers and articles from research organizations is already quite significant. The primary sources for this thesis, however, are the official policy documents created by the AU.

This literature review intends to be a survey and discussion of the significant literature about the APSA and is organized in two steps. First, it reviews the most relevant literature about the topic, focusing on two books published last year and some articles and monographs. Second, it reviews thematically the official documents of the AU related to the APSA, by its main mechanisms.

Two important books emerged in the last year: *Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions*, edited by Ulf Engel and J. Gomes Porto; and, *Crafting an African Security Architecture: Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century*, edited by Hany Besada. Both were published by Ashgate and assess African regional security arrangements with its evolving peace and security architecture.

Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions is divided into eight chapters and focuses on the internal dynamics of the African continent. This book provides an informed and critical analysis of the operationalization and institutionalization of the APSA. Editors and authors recognize that the political, institutional and normative processes that underpin the transformation of the OAU into the AU have the potential to transform the way the

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continent addresses the challenges of security. However, they assume there are many risks and the implementation and successful actualization of the APSA are not assured. They reveal three interrelated challenges: (1) the individual interests of Member States and of RECs may reveal 'self-help' strategies, which directly contradict the norms agreed upon and may hinder APSA's institutional developments; (2) is the continuing violation by several Member States of fundamental principles such as the sanctity of human life and respect of human rights, democratic practices and good governance, rule of law and protection of fundamental freedoms; these non-compliances will certainly require constant monitoring; and (3) the institutionalization of the APSA has revealed serious capacity deficits. In a context where organizational development, training, and additional recruitment of staff are urgent, the questions on the sustainability of the APSA are many (Engel and Porto 2010).

Crafting an African Security Architecture: Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century is divided into twelve chapters and provides an overview of the peace and security challenges facing the African continent, with topics ranging from integration methods, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), and responsibility to protect (R2P) to peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and the APSA. It does not identify an overall conclusion of the arguments presented in the twelve chapters, but present useful insights about each of these issues. Most relevant for this thesis is the topic about *African Solutions for African Problems* and the one about *Hope and Challenges for the APSA*. Regarding African solutions for African problems, the authors argue that difficult security problems, be they practical or normative in kind, require complex solutions. In order to find widespread approval and improvement of top-

down security means, more emphasis should be given to prevention, actual analysis of roots of conflicts on the ground, as well as incorporation of systemic causes in the overall assessment and solution-finding process. This would imply not only scrutinizing the problems and actors of actual host countries, but also the programs and actions of international organizations and actors. The authors also argue that it seems important for the APSA to further strengthen and expand the continental and sub-regional organizations to bridge the general divide between self-reliance and further internationalization of security. They would provide for regional and continental alternatives in form of organizations that reliably serve as building blocks within the international peace and security arena, enhance (e.g. AU and peer review mechanism) continental collaboration and coordination in security questions by providing for continuity and a (preventive) diplomacy platform, and strengthen the continent's own role concerning norm creation and diffusion (Besada, Goetz, and Werner 2010, 9).

Concerning the hope and challenges for the APSA, the authors provide a short overview of the APSA mechanisms and point to the encouraging decrease in the number of wars and greater prosperity and stability many States in the region have shown. They note that progress has been made. However, they argue that the lack of State capacity, coordination, resources, and the AU's unwillingness to confront fellow leaders among others, means that Africa has not operationalized its peace and security architecture. Further integration between the AU and UN is the primary recommendation as the way forward for the AU (Besada, Goetz, and Werner 2010, 11).

One of the most important research organizations in the realm of the APSA is the Institute for Security Studies, a pan-African applied policy research institute. Dr. Jakkie

Cilliers,[7] the Executive Director, has presented numerous papers at conferences and seminars and published a number of articles on various matters relating to peace and security in Africa.

In 2008, Cilliers wrote an important article about the *African Standby Force* (ASF), where he presented the challenges for its progress and establishment. He argued that strategically the lack of adequate financial resources and the lack of capacity at the level of the AU are the two major obstacles for the operationalization of the ASF and, consequently, of the APSA. He presented some structural problems, such as the lack of coordination and engagement between the AU and the five regions. In addition, he argued that the development of some systems, like logistics, training, command and control are based on political and not on practical considerations. Finally, he wrote that some African partners (European and Americans) have seized on the ASF concept to such a degree that it sometimes undermines African ownership. This is most pronounced in West and East Africa, where the number of officers seconded from donor countries to training, planning, and regional structures are rapidly outnumbering their African compatriots. For Cilliers, that is not appropriate and the "AU and the various regions should ensure that they assume ownership and drive donor support and not the other way around" (Cilliers 2008, 18).

Cilliers also wrote about the *Continental Early Warning System* (CEWS) in 2005. He provided an overview of CEWS essential characteristics as a continental system, presented a brief history of the development of this system, and explained the key differences between intergovernmental early warning and national intelligence systems.

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[7]He also contributed with articles for the two reviewed books.

He offered two major conclusions: the first was that the functioning of the early warning system should be insulated from executive influence and any formal engagement with national intelligence agencies. The second conclusion was that early warning systems, at whatever level, should develop a methodologically sound, but simple and clear system for ongoing monitoring to help establish a baseline for conflict analysis. For Cilliers, conflict prevention is a much cheaper and more appropriate role for the African Union than conflict intervention and in this context, the role of the CEWS is central (Cilliers, 2005).

The African Union's Emerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect, written by Kristiana Powell, is one relevant monograph for this topic, also published by the Institute of Security Studies in 2005. The author argues that the AU's emerging security architecture places the continental organization within a robust security system consisting of African regional arrangements and mechanisms, the United Nations (UN), and other key members of the international community. Yet there are a number of challenges confronting African regional organizations and their efforts to fulfill a peace and security mandate. These include questionable legitimacy, resource and capacity constraints, and conflicting political agendas. Donor initiatives may further exacerbate these broad differences inasmuch as they focus on certain regions over others and support regional organizations with overlapping membership. Ultimately, however, the AU and the rest of the international community will need to use a range of tools to deliver on the new peace and security agenda in Africa. Political initiatives to prevent, manage, and resolve conflict need to be matched with strategies on the part of national, regional and international

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actors to address the social and political vulnerabilities at the root of conflict (Powell 2005).

All these expert opinions and academic views are very important to construct an informed opinion and to understand the strategic contours of the APSA. Numerous research organizations worldwide have also published several papers about some of the topics involving the APSA. However, it is possible to identify in all these sources generalized opinions about the APSA development. They include resource and capacity constraints, conflicting political agendas and difficulties in coordination between the continental level (of the AU) and regional level (of the RECs), but also the finding that relevant progress has been made and the belief that the AU has the potential to transform the way the continent addresses the challenges of security.

As one can perceive, the security challenges that Africans face are not easy to address. They are complex and represent an important obstacle for African security and development, requiring comprehensive approaches and strategies, at the continental and the regional level, with the support of other partners. The role of the AU is vital in coordinating and developing the security mechanisms. Therefore, it is fundamental to review thematically the official documents of the AU, which will provide the adequate paradigm to analyze the strategic importance of the APSA.

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Security, Threats and the Common African Defense
and Security Policy

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In the *Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defense and Security Policy*, signed in 2004, the AU adopted a definition of the concept of security and identified the main threats for Africa.

The concept of security incorporates two approaches. The concept first

encompasses the traditional, state-centric, notion of the survival of the State and its

protection by military means from external aggression. The concept also encompasses the

non-military notion that is informed by the new international environment and high

incidence of intra-state conflict, with emphasis on human security, based not only on

political values but on social and economic imperatives as well (AU 2004, 3).

The main threats considered in the document are divided into internal and external

in relation to Africa. Common internal threats include inter-state conflicts/tensions, intra-

state conflicts/tensions; unstable post-conflict situations; grave humanitarian situations,

as well as other circumstances.[8] Common external threats refer to external challenges to

Africa's continental security,[9] which may endanger or have the potential, either directly

or indirectly, to constrain individual and collective efforts to achieve continental security

goals (AU 2004, 4-5).

The "development of a common defense policy" was established, as a principle,

in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU, in 2002 (AU 2002a). However, only two

years later, the *Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defense and Security Policy*

was signed. This important document, driving the policy and security architecture for

Africa, established that each African country's defense is "inextricably linked to that of

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[8]Like the plight of refugees and internally displaced persons and the insecurity caused by their presence; use of landmines and unexploded ordinance; pandemic diseases, human and drug trafficking, etc. (AU 2004, 5).

[9]Like the invasion of an African country; international conflicts and crises with adverse effects on African regional security; mercenarism; international terrorism and terrorist activities; the accumulation, stockpiling, proliferation and manufacturing of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, unconventional long-range and ballistic missiles; dumping of chemical and nuclear wastes, etc. (AU 2004, 5).

other African countries, as well as that of other regions and, by the same token, that of the African continent as a whole" (AU 2004, 2-3). This interdependence is also reflected in the *Principles and Values* of the policy and in its *Objectives and Goals*. In the *Principles and Values* it is established that any threat or aggression (internal or external to the continent) against an African country is deemed to be a threat or aggression on the other African countries, and the continent as a whole (AU 2004, 7). The *Objectives and Goals* of the policy are, among others: ensure collective responses; promote mutual trust and confidence; provide a framework to cooperate in defense matters, and enhance AU's capacity for and coordination of early action for conflict prevention containment, management, resolution and elimination of conflicts (AU 2004, 8-10).

In addition, in January 2005,[10] the AU Member States adopted another important document towards the collectivization of African security. The *AU Non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact* has the objectives to promote cooperation among the Member States in the areas of non-aggression and common defense; promote peaceful co-existence in Africa; prevent conflicts of inter-state or intra-state nature; and to ensure that disputes are resolved by peaceful means. Among other obligations, the Member States undertake to provide mutual assistance towards common defense and security, respond by all available means to aggression or threats of aggression against any Member State

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[10]It entered into force only in December 2009. Article 19 of this Pact stipulates that it shall enter into force thirty (30) days following the deposit of instruments of ratification by fifteen (15) Member States. According to AU's website Burkina Faso was the 15th Member State to ratify the Pact on 3 September 2009, and deposited its instrument of ratification with the African Union Commission on 18 November 2009. Consequently, the Pact entered into force on 18 December 2009.

and establish an African Army at the final stage of the political and economic integration of the Continent (AU 2005a).

The Peace and Security Council

Although the Assembly is the principal organ of the AU, the PSC should be considered the most important body of the AU regarding security issues (Kinzle 2008, 18). The PSC was created when the *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union* was approved by the AU in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002. The PSC began work in March 2004.

The PSC is a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict, and also a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa (AU 2004, 11). It oversees regional organizations and is the central point of contact for the United Nations[11] and other international organizations.

The PSC is composed of representatives from fifteen States,[12] nominated by the Assembly, and is supported by the "AU Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force, and a Special Fund" (AU 2002b, 5). In order to assist and advise the PSC in all questions relating to military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa, the

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[11]Since 2007, the PSC and the UNSC have instituted an annual consultation between the two organs, which is held alternately in Addis Ababa and in New York (AU 2009b).

[12]Five members are elected to three-year terms (one each from the five African regions, North, East, Southern, West and Central Africa) and ten members to two-year terms. The regional representation is as follows: Central (3); Eastern (3); Northern (2); Southern (3); and Western (4). The PSC meet at the level of Permanent Representatives, Ministers or Heads of State and Government.

Military Staff Committee (MSC) was created, composed of Senior Military Officers of the Members of the PSC (AU 2002b, 20).

The PSC has significant powers. It can authorize the mounting and deployment of peace support missions (under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter) and recommend to the Assembly, if appropriate, a military intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances; namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act (AU, 2002b).

<u>The Panel of the Wise</u>

The Panel of the Wise (PW) was created in 2002 by the *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*, in order to support the peace efforts of the PSC. It is composed of five highly respected African personalities, representing the five regions of the continent, which have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent (AU 2002b, 16). The PW members are selected by the Chairperson of the Commission after consultation with the Member States concerned, on the basis of regional representation and appointed by the Assembly to serve for a period of three years. At the request of the PSC or the Chairperson of the Commission, or at its own initiative, the PW advises and supports the efforts of the AU on all issues pertaining to the promotion, and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa (AU 2002b, 16).

In order to support the peace efforts, contribute effectively to conflict prevention and resolution, as well as to peace-building, and facilitate appropriate action by the PSC or the Chairperson of the Commission, the PW may take several actions:

1. Advise the Council and/or the Chairperson of the Commission on all matters within their respective competences pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa.
2. Facilitate the establishment of channels of communication between the Council and the Chairperson of the Commission, on the one hand, and parties engaged in a dispute, on the other hand, in order to prevent such dispute from escalating into conflict.
3. Carry out fact-finding missions as an instrument of conflict prevention in countries and/or regions where the Panel considers there is a danger of conflict either breaking out or seriously escalating.
4. Conduct shuttle diplomacy between parties to a conflict in cases where parties are not ready to engage in formal talks; encourage parties, where appropriate, to engage in political dialogue, adopt confidence-building measures, and carry out reconciliation processes, and facilitate such efforts, where appropriate.
5. Assist and advise mediation teams engaged in formal negotiations; assist and advise parties on how to resolve disputes related to the implementation of peace agreements; and develop and recommend ideas and proposals that can contribute to promoting peace, security and stability in the continent. (AU 2008)

The Commission supports administratively, logistically, and technically[13] the PW

(AU 2008).

The African Standby Force

After the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, a growing need was identified among the African countries for a capability to intervene in similar emergencies in case the United Nations and the International Community should respond too slowly or not at all (Kinzle 2008, 10). African Union Member States agreed to establish a military instrument in order to enable the PSC to perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to Article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act. What was envisaged for this military instrument were standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of

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[13]Such as the support in gathering and receiving information, or in the processing and production of documents.

origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice (AU 2002, 18). The final

concept for the ASF adopted by Heads of State provided for five standby brigade level

forces, one in each of Africa's five regions (see figure 2), supported by civilian police

(CivPol) and other capacities (Cilliers 2008, 1).

Figure 2.   ASF regions
Source: Jack Cilliers, *The African Standby Force: An Update on Progress*, 2008,
http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/The-African-Standby-Force-An-
Update-on-Progress.pdf (assessed July 16, 2011), 2.

The five Regional Economic Communities (RECs) serve as the building blocks of the ASF, contributing each one with a Regional Standby Brigade (Alghali and Mbaye 2008, 34). As not all countries in a particular region are part of the same REC, and since some Member States belong to more than one economic grouping, the AU had to form Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades in the Eastern and Northern Africa. In Northern Africa, the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC) was created, because Egypt is not member of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and Morocco not a part of the AU. In Eastern Africa, the East Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) was created, since Rwanda is not part of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In West, Central and Southern Africa, since most of the countries in each region belong to the same economic grouping, the respective RECs only had to upgrade their structures to support requirements of their respective brigades (Alghali and Mbaye 2008, 34).

The ASF was conceived to perform functions in six different missions and scenarios (see table 1).

Table 1. ASF missions and scenarios
Scenario 1: AU/regional military advice to a political mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate provided by the PSC.
Scenario 2: AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate.
Scenario 3: Stand-alone AU/regional observer mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate.
Scenario 4: AU/regional peacekeeping force for UN Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace building). Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate.
Scenario 5: AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers. ASF completed deployment required within 90 days of an AU mandate, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days.
Scenario 6: AU intervention, for example in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly. Here it is envisaged that the AU would have the capability to deploy a robust military force within 14 days.

Source: African Union, *A Vision for the African Stand-by Force? A Draft Document for Discussion*, 2005, http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/Asf/ doc/ASF%20vision-Second%20Draft%20Vision.doc (assessed July 20, 2011), 3.

The development and implementation of the APSA, both at continental and regional levels, included two phases: the first phase until June 2005 (later extended to June 2006), and the second one until June 2010 (AU 2003; Cilliers, 2008). The structure and the development envisaged for the ASF is explained in table 2.

	Continental Level		Regional Level
DEVELOPMENT AND ESTABLISHMENT	1st Phase (up to June 2006)	The AU should develop and maintain the full time capacity to manage Scenario 1 and 2 (military advice to political mission and co-deployed observer) missions, and establish a standby reinforcement system to manage Scenario 3 (stand-alone observer) missions.	Regions should within capacity develop their standby brigades within this phase. Where they can develop standby brigade groups, Regions should, by the end of this phase also develop the capacity to use a standby reinforcement system to manage Scenario 4 (AU/Regional PKF) missions.
	2ª Phase (up to June 2010)	While maintaining its full time capacity to manage Scenario 1 and 2, the AU should develop the capacity to manage up to Scenario 5 (complex PKF) missions.	All Regions should try to develop capabilities up to that of a standby brigade in this period, and those with existing brigades should increase their rapid deployment capability.
STRUCTURE	▪ an ASF Headquarters (HQ) with a continental Planning Element (PLANELM), comprising three components (military, police and civilians); ▪ one continental Military Logistics Depot (MLD); ▪ a standby roster of 300 to 500 military observers, centrally managed by the AU; ▪ a standby roster of 240 individual police officers, for up to two complex missions; and a roster of mission administration civilian personnel and experts for humanitarian; ▪ governance; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and other specialized disciplines − to be established and centrally managed by the AU.		▪ one permanent PLANELM, with at least one personnel member from each of the three components; ▪ one Standby Brigade with units (one contingent of military, and at least two companies of police/gendarmerie) on standby in Member States, to support two complex missions simultaneously; ▪ a roster of about 290 civilians for mission support and specialized roles; ▪ one MLD; ▪ centers of excellence and training facilities; and a permanent Brigade HQ.

Table 2.   Implementation and Structure of the ASF

Source: Jack Cilliers, *The African Standby Force: An Update on Progress*, 2008, http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/The-African-Standby-Force-An-Update-on-Progress.pdf (accessed September 21, 2011), 3.

<u>The Continental Early Warning System</u>

In order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, the *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC* of the AU, in 2002, established also a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The Protocol established that the information gathered by the CEWS supports the efforts of the Chairperson of the Commission to "timeously advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action" (AU 2002b, 17).

The CEWS consists of an observation and monitoring center (the *Situation Room*),[14] and observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms, linked directly to the CEWS (AU 2002b, 17). The Situation Room is located at the Conflict Management Division (CMD) of the AU Peace and Security Department in Addis Ababa. It is responsible for data collection and analysis based on an appropriate *early warning indicators module*. The observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room (AU 2002b, 17). It is interesting to note that the design and development of the CEWS has been achieved by a collaborative effort through a series of consultations with a wide variety of stakeholders in Africa and elsewhere, which included regional organizations, international partner organizations, civil society, and research and academic institutions (AU 2008c, 3).

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[14]The Situation Room provides a point of contact service between the AU and its various field missions, Member States as well as other Organizations; replies to requests for information and inquiries from a wide variety of stakeholders relating to the Peace and Security Department as a whole; and serves as the main contact point between the CMD and UNDPKO (AU 2008b, 8).

The purpose of the CEWS is the provision of timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security to several key AU institutions, including the Chairperson of the Commission, the PSC, and the PW, in order to enable the development of appropriate response strategies to prevent or limit the destructive effects of violent conflict. Therefore, this link between analysis and response is a fundamental underpinning of the CEWS (AU 2008c, 6). In order to fulfill its purpose effectively, the following four key elements are essential to the operationalization of the CEWS: data collection; strategic analysis; reports and engagement with decision-makers; and coordination and collaboration (AU 2008b, 3).

Data Collection

Pursuant to the provisions contained in the PSC Protocol, data collection to analyze developments within the continent and to recommend the best course of action must be based on "clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators" (AU 2002, 17).

The CEWS is an open-source system where data is compiled from different sources, including governmental and inter-governmental actors, international and non-governmental organizations, the media, academia and think tanks. Key sources of data include those generated by the AU itself (Commission, AU field missions and liaison offices), as well as that generated at the level of the RECs and Member States, collaboration with the UN, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centers, academic institutions and NGOs (AU 2008b, 4).

In order to optimise and systematise existing products and processes, the draft roadmap for the operationalization of the CEWS proposed: the introduction of an

automated data gathering and processing system (including but not limited to news clippings); the introduction of an internal news trends tracking service; the development of a system of grading sources and reports to diminish information overflow and to increase efficiency; greater use of African information sources, particularly in indigenous languages; and, finally, the strengthening of the existing system of internal country profiles through the introduction of sub-national detail (AU 2008b, 5).

<div align="center">Strategic Analysis</div>

Strategic analysis and the timely development of policy options requires the continuous monitoring of political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators (AU 2008b, 5).

The Indicators Module, a core component of the CEWS, has been developed by the AU bearing in mind a limited number of flexible easy-to-monitor indicators and easy-to-control thresholds, based on an inductive approach and taking into account financial and institutional constraints. This module allows the CEWS to undertake the systematic monitoring of risk indicators, including the analysis of trends and dynamics and their significance in their specific, structural contexts. Attention is focused on a limited number of cases: situations that are (1) extremely likely to face violent conflict in the immediate future, or (2) are already in conflict, or (3) have been in conflict in their more recent past. While the immediate focus must be on significant threats of violence and loss of life, the indicators module must also focus on underlying structural causes of conflict (AU 2008b, 5).

The functioning of the Indicators Module is relatively simple (see figure 3). Once a situation matches a limited number of generic indicators, a Strategic Conflict

Assessment (SCA) will be undertaken in order to identify case-specific indicator-building information. On this basis, thresholds will then be defined through analysis by the CMD staff. The generation of this indicator-serving information will allow for monitoring of the situation. Based on established procedures and standards, the CMD will then report to its end-users (decision-makers) to alert them on upcoming potential for violent conflict and enable them to take the appropriate political action (AU 2008d, 3).

Figure 3.   CEWS and the indicators module

Source: African Union, *Proposal for an Indicators Module towards the Operationalization of the CEWS for the AU*, 2008, http://www.africa-union.org/root/ AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/PSC/CD/9_Proposal%20for%20an%20Indicators%20Modul e.pdf (assessed July 16, 2011), 2.

Reports and Engagement with Decision-makers

In order to accurately support the African Union in the management of crisis situations, the CEWS must "have the ability to appropriately engage decision-makers, including the Bureau of the Chairperson of the Commission, the PSC and other stakeholders" (AU 2008b, 6).

The primary tools for engagement with decision-makers are information reports;[15] some examples are news highlights, situation reports, mission reports, flash reports and early warning reports (AU 2008b, 6).

Coordination and Collaboration

As integral components of the overall security architecture of the AU, Regional Mechanisms are given an important and specific role in the development and implementation of the CEWS. The PSC Protocol recognizes that aspects of harmonization and coordination are important as a means to assuring that their "activities are consistent with the objectives and principles of the Union" and calls for an effective partnership between the Regional Mechanisms and the PSC (AU 2008b, 10). Regional Mechanisms are urged to continuously inform the PSC on their activities and when necessary brief the PSC. Likewise, the PSC shall keep, through the Chairperson of the Commission, the Regional Mechanisms fully and continuously informed of its activities (AU 2008b, 10).

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[15]According to the UN University, two types of reports are produced in the Situation Room, on a daily basis: Daily News Highlights (compiled by open media sources and distributed to a large audience), and Daily Report (compiled using field mission data and distributed only internally). Periodically, it also issues Flash Reports whenever there is breaking news, Weekly Updates on Somalia and Sudan, and Compiled Reports on particular issues when requested by Commission staff" (UN University 2008, 21).

The draft roadmap for the operationalization of the CEWS proposed a number of practical strategies for coordination between the AU and the regional mechanisms. Those included: regular exchange of information, convening of periodic meetings, strengthening of existing personnel exchange programs and joint training and capacity building activities, establishment of liaison offices in both the AU and the RECs, and establishment of a secure website for the exchange of information (AU 2008b, 10). The overall goal is to develop a "continental framework" of information and analysis sharing able to build and supplement the efforts already developed by Regional Mechanisms.

The collaboration with a wide variety of stakeholders beyond AU structures and governmental and intergovernmental actors is also very important. International organizations, research centers, academic institutions and NGOs are considered integral to the adequate functioning of the CEWS, and are encouraged to actively participate in efforts towards peace in Africa (AU 2008b, 11).

<div align="center">The Peace Fund</div>

A special fund, known as the "Peace Fund," was established in Article 21 of the PSC Protocol, in order to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security in Africa (AU 2002b, 26).

The Peace Fund is made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of the AU, as well as voluntary contributions from Member States and from other sources outside and within Africa, including partners, the private sector, civil society and individuals, as well as through appropriate fund raising activities (AU 2002b, 26).

<u>The Memorandum of Understanding between
the AU and the Regional Mechanisms</u>

The Article 16 of the PSC Protocol addresses the relationship between the AU and the regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution. It establishes that the regional mechanisms are part of the overall security architecture and endorses the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission to harmonize and coordinate the activities of regional mechanisms in the field of peace, security and stability. It also established the need to conclude a *Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Commission and the Regional Mechanisms* (AU 2002b, 24).

In June 2008, the *Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in the area of peace and security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the coordinating mechanisms of the regional standby brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa* was finally signed. The parties that signed the MoU were the African Union (AU), the eight RECs[16] officially recognized by the AU, the East Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM)[17] and the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC).

The overall goal of the MoU between the mentioned parties is to institutionalize and strengthen their cooperation and closely coordinate their activities in realm of African peace, security and stability. MoU objectives are:

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[16]Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

[17]The East Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) and the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC) are not managed by RECs.

(i) contribute to the full operationalization and effective functioning of the African Peace and Security Architecture;
(ii) ensure the regular exchange of information between the Parties on all their activities pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa;
(iii) foster closer partnership between the Parties in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent, as well as to enhance coordination between their activities;
(iv) develop and implement joint programs and activities in the area of peace, security and stability in Africa;
(v) ensure that the activities of the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms are consistent with the objectives and principles of the Union;
(vi) facilitate coordination and enhance partnership between the Parties, on the one hand, and the United Nations and its agencies, as well as other relevant international organizations, on the other hand;
(vii) contribute to ensuring that any external initiative in the field of peace and security on the continent takes place within the framework of the objectives and principles of the Union; and
(viii) build and strengthen the capacity of the Parties in the areas covered by the Memorandum. (AU 2008e)

The MoU establishes that the parties "shall work towards the full operationalization and effective functioning of the African Peace and Security Architecture" (Au 2008e). The parties agreed to make the CEWS and the ASF fully operational and to cooperate in other security areas, including: conflict prevention, management and resolution; humanitarian action and disaster management; post-conflict reconstruction and development; arms control and disarmament; counter-terrorism, prevention and combating of trans-national organized crime; border management; and resource mobilization.

Arrangements for cooperation between the AU and the parties included exchange of information, meetings and other mechanisms for enhancing cooperation, institutional presence, and joint activities and field coordination.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study is a descriptive study in the realm of strategy, focused on creating a holistic and meaningful picture about the mechanisms and purpose of the APSA. The APSA is relatively new and important strategic process in Africa. It is the intent of this study to analyze the mechanisms developed, or in a developing stage, by the AU and regional organizations to address peace and security issues in the African continent, with the ultimate goal of contributing to a better understanding of African security context at the strategic level.

Having defined the background and the framework for this thesis on chapter 1, and a concise description of available relevant sources on chapter 2, this chapter presents the methodology used to collect the data required to answer the research questions and explains the methodology used to analyze the data collected and formulate the conclusions.

Data Collection

In the realm of social sciences research it is possible to distinguish between qualitative (or informal) or quantitative (formal) methods of information gathering. Generally in the quantitative methods, the main goals are to quantify variation, to predict causal relationships or to describe characteristics of a population; in the qualitative methods, the main goals are to describe variation, individual experiences and group norms, or explain relationships.

The research described in this study is based solely on qualitative research methods. The advantage of using this type of methods lies in its ability to provide complex textual descriptions of how the APSA is being developed, helping the reader to interpret and better understand its complex reality.

For the purposes of this study, data was collected through the analysis of various documents. The methodology had three phases: first, the identification and compilation of relevant documents for the topic; second, screening the documents by its relevance to the topic; third, synthesizing and analyzing the selected documents. Due to time constraints and the impossibility of gathering information through other methods, this method proved appropriate for the study. The main sources for this document-based research were:

1. AU website, for official documents of the AU;

2. Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), for books and other electronic papers. The library also facilitated inter-library book loans with other libraries that possessed the books required for the research;

3. National or International Organizations websites, for official reports or other documents;

4. Research Organization websites, for research papers.

5. Other websites, for other documents or papers.

<u>Analysis Methodology</u>

This study is a descriptive study in the realm of strategic studies. Therefore, the analysis methodology is grounded in the strategic reference paradigm (see figure 4).

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
Figure 4. The strategic paradigm

Source: Created by author.

According to Yarger, strategy is the "disciplined calculation of overarching objectives, concepts, and resources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable future outcomes than might otherwise exist if left to chance or the hands of others" (Yarger 2006, 5). It bridges the gap between the realities of today and a desired future, considering the best way to apply resources to achieve desired results in a specific strategic environment over time. In the context of the State, strategy deals with the employment of instruments of power (political/diplomatic, economic, military, informational, and others) to "achieve the political objectives of the State in cooperation

or in competition with other actors pursuing their own--possibly conflicting--objectives"
(Yarger 2006, 5).[18]

Strategy differs from planning because strategy has distinct attributes and differs
in its scope, assumptions, and premises. Both strategy and planning use Ends, Ways, and
Means, and are bounded by the criteria of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability, but
strategy has its own inherent logic that can be understood and applied (Yarger 2006, 5).
According to Luttwak this logic of strategy is paradoxical "very different from the
ordinary "linear" logic by which we live in all other spheres of life" (Luttwak 2001, 2).
Luttwak illustrates this paradoxical logic by arguing that "only in the paradoxical realm
of strategy would the choice arise at all, because it is only in war that a bad road can be
good *precisely because it is bad* and may therefore be less strongly defended or even left
unguarded by the enemy" (Luttwak 2001, 3).

These considerations about the essence of strategy were synthesized and
systematized by Arthur F. Lykke, the father of the Army War College's Ends-Ways-
Means strategic model (see figure 5). In the Lykke model the Ends are "objectives," the
Ways are the "concepts" for accomplishing the objectives, and the Means are the
"resources" for supporting the concepts (Yarger 2008, 46). For Lykke, this general model
can be used as a basis for the formulation of any type strategy--military, political,
economic, etc., depending upon the element of power employed. A valid strategy must
have an appropriate balance of Ends, Ways and Means or its success is at greater risk. For

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[18]Yarger clarifies his definition of strategy in the context of States: "Strategy is all about
how (way or concept) leadership will use the power (means or resources) available to the state to
exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends)
that support State interests" (Yarger 2008, 43).

Lykke, risk represents the possibility of loss or damage, of not achieving an objective

(Lykke 2001, 179-183).

Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means.	
Component	Definition
Ends	Objectives towards which one strives
Ways	Course of action
Means	Instruments by which some end can be achieved

Figure 5.   Lykke's Ends-Ways-Means strategic model
Source: Arthur Lykke, *Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy*,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub362.pdf (assessed September
11, 2011), 179.

For Yarger, Ends, Ways, and Means often get confusing in the development or

analysis of a specific strategy; for him the trick is to focus on the questions. Objectives

will always answer the question of "what" one is trying to achieve. Concepts (or Ways)

always explain "how" the resources will be used. Resources (or Means) always explain

what will be used to execute the concept. For Yarger, risk is "the assessment of the

balance among what is known, assumed, and unknown" (2006, 63). It explains the gap

between what is to be achieved and the Ways and Means available to achieve the

objective. "Since there are never enough resources or a clever enough concept to assure

100 percent success in the competitive international environment, there is always some

risk. The strategist seeks to minimize this risk through his development of the strategy--

the balance of Ends, Ways, and Means" (Yarger 2008, 47).

For the purposes of this thesis the analysis methodology is based on the strategic model Ends-Ways-Means. The different components of the strategic model serve as the referents for analyzing the mechanisms of the APSA. The following table indicates the relations between the analysis methodology, the evaluation criteria and the research questions, linking the diverse parts of the overall research design.

Table 3. Analysis methodology, evaluation criteria and research questions				
ENDS	**WAYS**	**MEANS**	**EVALUATION CRITERIA**	**RESEARCH QUESTIONS**
Objectives and goals of the Common African Defense and Security Policy	Diplomatic	Peace and Security Council; AU Commission; Panel of the Wise.	• Development stage: milestones and/or performance; • Suitability: relates to Ends (will its attainment accomplish the effect desired?); • Feasibility: relates to Ways and Means (can the action be accomplished by the Means available?).	PQ: To what extent is the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) a viable security strategy to deal with the principal threats in Africa SQ: What are the main security objectives of the African Union, within its African Peace and Security Architecture? SQ: How do the different mechanisms of APSA articulate and develop themselves to achieve its objectives? SQ: How can the APSA contribute to the mitigation of threats in Africa?
	Informational	Continental Early Warning System		
	Military	African Standby Force		
	Economic	Peace Fund		

Source: Created by author.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the research findings

through the lenses of the analysis methodology presented in chapter 3. This chapter

applies the strategic model Ends-Ways-Means to analyze the mechanisms developed, or

in a developing stage, by the AU and regional organizations to address security issues in

the African continent, with the ultimate goal of contributing to a better understanding of

African security context at the strategic level. It begins by describing and analyzing the

suitability of the Ends established for the APSA, particularly the extent of its contribution

for the accomplishment of the desired effect of promoting and consolidating peace and

security on the African continent. Posteriorly it describes and analyzes the application of

the four classic strategic Ways--diplomatic, military, informational and economic--to the

particular case of the APSA, as well as its respective Means. Ways and respective Means

are analyzed together to scrutinize its overall feasibility, i.e., the extent in which the

Ways can be accomplished by its Means. In order to do that it is indispensable to analyze

the development stage of each of the Means: Diplomatic–Peace and Security Council,

Commission, and Panel of the Wise; Military–African Standby Force; Informational–

Continental Early Warning System; and Economic–Peace Fund.

The APSA is a very complex security system, relying on regional and continental

intergovernmental organizations, on the will of African peoples and on the support of a

countless number of partners. Covering all processes that are underway in the APSA with

the appropriate level of depth is a colossal task. Therefore, the main challenge in this

chapter was to find a proper level of analysis, comprehensively enough to provide

answers to the research questions.

The Ends of the APSA

In the realm of strategy, Ends are objectives or goals that answer the question of

"what" one is trying to achieve. The *Common African Defense and Security Policy*

(CADSP), signed in 2004, is essentially a strategy based on a set of principles, objectives

and instruments with the overall desired effect of promoting and consolidating peace and

security on the continent (Touray 2005, 636). The CADSP establishes the security

strategic goals for the APSA, including:

> a) Ensure collective responses to both internal and external threats to Africa; . . .
> f) provide a framework for AU Member States to cooperate in defense matters, through training of military personnel; exchange of military intelligence and information (subject to restrictions imposed by national security); the development of military doctrine; and the building of collective capacity. . . .
> h) allow for efficient re-allocation of resources to address the most threatening of the defense and security challenges; . . .
> m) develop and enhance the collective defense and strategic capability as well as military preparedness of Member States of the AU and the Continent; . . .
> q) provide a framework to establish and operationalize the ASF provided for in the Protocol Establishing the PSC;
> r) facilitate the establishment of a threat deterrence and containment capacity within the AU. (AU 2004, 8)

The objectives of the CADSP are "essentially to respond to both internal and

external threats effectively" (Touray 2005, 643). The CADSP classifies internal and

external threats (see table 4) as dangers to the common defense and security interests of

the continent, undermining the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and

stability (AU 2004, 3).

Table 4. Main African Common Security Threats	
Internal Threats	External Threats
▪ Inter-state conflicts/tensions (including situations that undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity); ▪ Intra-state conflicts/tensions (including war crimes, genocides, and coup d'états); ▪ Unstable post-conflict situations; ▪ Grave humanitarian situations, as well as other circumstances (including violent and other crimes, including organized and cross border crimes). *(Note: Twenty-two (22) different threats are labeled as Internal Threats in the CADSP)*	▪ External aggression, including the invasion of an African country; ▪ International conflicts and crises with adverse effects on African regional security; ▪ Mercenarism; ▪ International terrorism and terrorist activities; ▪ The adverse effect of globalization and unfair international political and economic policies, practices and regimes; ▪ The accumulation, stockpiling, proliferation and manufacturing of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, unconventional long-range and ballistic missiles; ▪ Cross-border crimes such as drug and human trafficking (which may constitute a threat at the regional and national levels); ▪ Unilateral policies aimed at isolating African countries; ▪ Dumping of chemical and nuclear wastes in Africa.

Source: African Union, "Solemn declaration on a common African defence and security policy," 2004, http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/2ND%20EX%20ASSEMBLY/ Declaration%20on %20a%20Comm.Af%20Def%20Sec.pdf (assessed September 10, 2011), 3.

Analyzing these threats, some inferences can be drawn. First, the internal threats are related to the peace dimension of the APSA (addressing conflicts) and the external threats are related with to the security dimension (addressing other security threats). Second, the number of threats identified in the CASDP is very high. The document identifies thirty-one (31) different threats to the common defense and security interests of

the continent. Although these threats are grouped into internal[19] and external to the

African continent, they are extremely diverse (in its nature, capabilities or intentions)

making it very complex and challenging to find balanced Ways and Means to mitigate all

of these threats.

Third, most of these threats are interconnected and affect the development and

security of the continent. In today's strategic context, in Africa or elsewhere, situations

and problems such as terrorism, civil wars, organized crime or extreme poverty, are

interrelated and cannot be addressed separately. In order to mitigate all these threats,

comprehensive approaches are required, overcoming narrow preoccupations and working

across the whole range of issues, in a coordinated and integrated way.

Fourth, the CASDP does not specifically addresses maritime security threats.[20]

Every year in Africa "billions of dollars' worth of fish is illegally captured, billions of

dollars' worth of drugs and arms are shipped overseas, pirates capture and hold for

ransom hundreds of mariners operating commercial and private vessels, bandits steal

maritime oil worth billions of dollars, and thousands of liters of waste are illegally

dumped" (Baker 2011, 39). As one can see in the Gulf of Aden or in the Gulf of Guinea,

these issues are also dangers to the security interests of the African continent,

undermining the maintenance and promotion of security and stability.

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[19]The internal threats are organized in four clusters: Inter-state conflicts/tensions; intra-state conflicts/tensions; unstable post-conflict situations; and grave humanitarian situations, as well as other circumstances.

[20]A cross-department task-force, including experts from the RECs and RMs, to develop an integrated, coherent and comprehensive 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM-Strategy) was formed in June 2011 at the Commission. The goal is that the 2050 AIM-Strategy should be ready for adoption by January 2012 (AU 2011a).

Fifth, the CASDP does not addresses cyber security threats. The low cost and virtual nature of cyber space makes it an attractive domain for use by those who seek to use cyber space for malicious purposes. The African continent is facing several challenges related to the Internet in relation to security risk, intellectual property infringement, and protection of financial information and personal data. "As Internet penetration increases across the African continent, so does the risk of sophisticated cyber-attacks, threatening African nations' security, infrastructure, economic growth and citizen services" (Diarra 2010).[21] "Ninety-nine percent of all e-mails worldwide constituted spam. Most of them come from Africa" according to Moktar Yedaly, Head of the Telecom and Postal Division of the Commission stressing that the continent needs to be serious about taking measures to ensure cyber safety (Yedaly 2011).

The Ways and respective Means

In the strategic model, Ways are courses of action that explain "how" the Means will be used, and Means are the resources or instruments that will be used to execute the strategic concept defined by the different Ways. The Ways and Means analyzed in this section are directly related by its nature: The diplomatic Way with the PSC, the Commission, and the PW; The military Way with the African Standby Force; the informational Way with the Continental Early Warning System; and the economic Way with the Peace Fund.

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[21]Cheick Diarra is the Microsoft Chairman for Africa (Diarra 2010).

The Diplomatic Ways and Means

The Protocol that created the PSC establishes in its Article 6 two[22] primary

diplomatic Ways to achieve the strategic goals: preventive diplomacy and peacemaking,

particularly by the "use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and enquiry" (AU 2002,

8). Preventive diplomacy strives to resolve a dispute before it escalates into violence.

Peacemaking, generally, seeks to promote a ceasefire and to negotiate an agreement.

The APSA is based on a paradigm that recognizes preventive diplomacy as

central to address peace and security challenges in Africa. African Leaders consider that

the comprehensive and coherent use of preventive diplomacy is important in creating the

conditions for sustainable peace (Zuma 2011, 6). According to South Africa President,

Jacob Zuma, preventive diplomacy initiatives are more cost-effective than the

deployment of peacekeepers once a conflict has broken out. Therefore, it is essential that

the "efforts of both the African Union and the numerous sub regional organizations

across the continent working on preventive diplomacy be respected and supported by the

UN and the international community as a whole" (Zuma 2011, 6).

The other diplomatic Way established by the Protocol is based on the use of

diplomatic methods, mainly mediation, good offices, conciliation and enquiry. All four

methods are anchored in Article 33 of the Charter of the UN, under its Chapter VI,

Pacific Settlement of Disputes. Under these methods, the parties to the dispute retain

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[22]The Protocol also refers that the PSC may "institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of Government takes place in a Member State" (AU 2002b, 9). The Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Union define broadly some of these sanctions. The PSC has issued a series of sanctions against Togo, the Comoros, Mauritania, Guinea, Niger and Madagascar. The norm has been the suspension of Governments from the activities of the Union (CDD 2010).

control of the outcome of the dispute in that they remain free to accept or reject any

proposal for resolution (Mackenzie 2005, 29). The boundaries between these methods are

sometimes unclear, and one procedure can often lead to another.

> *Mediation* is an activity undertaken by a third party with the intention of achieving a compromise or a settlement of issues between conflicting parties.
> *Good offices* may be characterized as rather less proactive than mediation–involving the facilitation of negotiation rather than actively seeking and proposing solutions.
> *Conciliation* generally involves an impartial examination of a dispute by a conciliator or a conciliation commission established by the parties that attempts to assist parties to resolve the dispute by defining and recommending the terms of a possible settlement.
> *Enquiry* as a distinct form of dispute resolution process involves an independent investigation of an issue disputed by two or more parties. (Mackenzie 2005, 36-39)

From these four methods, mediation processes have often been employed in

attempts to resolve conflicts on the African continent. In recent years, the AU and sub-

regional organizations have played an important role in mediating hotspot issues in

Africa, namely in the Sudan, Burundi and Madagascar. "Their success shows that

regional and sub-regional organizations have unique political, moral and geographic

advantages in preventing and resolving local conflicts" (Jiechi 2011, 16).

However, the APSA still requires an institutionalization of mediation processes.

In order to move from *ad hoc* mediation initiatives to more institutionalized and

systematic ones the AU peace and security agenda needs to enhance its mediation

mechanisms and processes. "Partnerships among African states; between the AU and

regional organizations; the AU, EU and UN; and between AU and civil society

organizations are important in order to ensure that there is cooperation, coordination,

joint solutions and support among and within the actors in the field of conflict resolution

and mediation" (ACCORD 2009, 34).

<u>The Peace and Security Council</u>

The PSC is the central diplomatic instrument of the APSA. It is the point of contact with international organizations such as the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the Political and the Security Committee of the EU. The Protocol relating to its creation establishes that the PSC performs functions in the areas of preventive diplomacy and peace-making, including the use of good offices, mediation,[23] conciliation and enquiry (AU 2002 8). It is a representative Organ of all regions and Governments of the AU, usually meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives (habitually diplomats). Moreover, the PSC is the standing decision-making organ for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa, conceived to timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations (AU 2002, 4).

The PSC is empowered to take diplomatic initiatives and action it deems appropriate with regard to situations of potential and actual conflicts. To that end, it uses its discretion to effect entry, whether through the collective intervention of the Council or through its Chairperson and/or the Chairperson of the Commission, the PW, and/or in collaboration with regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution (AU 2002, 14). The PSC may establish subsidiary bodies that include *ad hoc* committees for mediation, conciliation or enquiry, consisting of an individual State or group of States (AU 2002, 12).

Presently, the PSC is fully operational, has already met more than 250 times, addressing conflicts and crisis situations facing the continent. It has acquired credibility,

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[23]An example of using mediation: through a PSC decision, the AU assumed the political responsibility of mediating between the government of Sudan and armed resistance movements the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation Army.

illustrated amongst other things, by the annual meetings it now holds with the UNSC and with the Political and Security Committee of the EU (AU 2009b).

The PSC has become a focus of "collective security decisions by African for Africans" (Sturman and Hayatou 2010, 57). In response to urgent security issues, it has been able to act more decisively than the larger Assembly of 53 Member States of the AU and has shifted the AU from a tradition of non-interference in domestic affairs to a new approach, using sanctions and more assertive regional diplomacy (Sturman and Hayatou 2010, 57).

The focus of the decisions, so far, has been on conflict management and resolution, rather than conflict prevention.[24] This is due to capacity constraints and the intensity and complexity of conflicts, but also to a lack of political will, reflecting the power politics and interests in Africa (Sturman and Hayatou 2010, 69). However, the Protocol that creates the PSC took account of the need for regional balance so as to minimize tensions and increase the potential for consensus in dealing with contentious issues such as military intervention (AU 2010a, 22). Consensus[25] has remained the norm by which all decisions have been reached. In addition, "it factored in the power balance among its membership by emphasizing the need for members of the PSC to not only be

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[24]"Nor has the PSC devoted much attention to the nonmilitary dimensions of security, such as environmental degradation, organized crime, and disease. This limited focus is the result of analytical and operational capacity deficiencies, as well as the regularity of hot crises, which makes it difficult for the PSC to tackle the upstream and structural aspects of conflict mitigation" (Williams 2011, 7).

[25]The PSC decisions are generally based on the principle of consensus. However, in case of failure to reach a consensus, decisions on procedural matters are by a simple majority and substantive matters by a two-thirds majority of members eligible to vote (Sturman and Hayatou 2010, 66).

willing to participate in resolving conflicts, but most importantly, to possess the

necessary political, military, financial and diplomatic muscle to do so" (AU 2010a, 22).

Nevertheless, this mode of decision-making seems not only time-consuming, but by

institutionalizing it, it allows Member States with a strategic interest in a particular

conflict to block some kind of intervention (Sturman and Hayatou 2010, 69).

It is important to highlight that in just seven years the PSC has made significant

achievements in addressing the various conflict and crisis situations and has significantly

improved its methods. However, the PSC faces still important challenges. PSC

authorizations to deploy peacekeepers to Burundi (AMIB), Comoros (AMISEC), Sudan

(AMIS) and more recently Somalia (AMISOM) exposed a major gap between the PSC's

willingness to authorize such missions and the AU's ability to implement them. Shortage

of resources--human and material--has emerged as a major shortfall. This mandate-

resource gap may in the long run erode its credibility (AU 2010a, 26). Additionally, there

has been some lack of interaction between the PSC and other APSA components,

primarily due to the fact some of the components are still being operationalized (AU

2010a, 31). Institutionally, the PSC is mandated to work with the Chairperson of the

Commission. Although the Commission has been providing the PSC with regular reports

on progress and challenges on issues of peace and security on the continent, what has

been missing is the link between the PSC and the PW (AU 2010a 28).

The diplomatic role of the AU Commission

The Commission has a very important diplomatic role within the APSA. Under

the authority of the PSC, and in consultation with all parties involved in a conflict, the

Chairperson of the AU may deploy efforts and take all initiatives deemed appropriate to

prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. Therefore, at his own initiative or when requested by the PSC, he may use his good offices, either personally or through special envoys, special representatives, the PW or the Regional Mechanisms, to exercise diplomatic efforts. He is assisted by a commissioner in charge of peace and security to provide operational support to the PSC.[26] The Commission also ensures the implementation and follow-up of the decisions of the PSC and of the Assembly (AU 2002, 15).

The principal operational mechanism of mediation at the AU is, in fact, the Commission. It implements mediation interventions and takes decisions regarding their composition and nature. The mediation efforts have so far taken the form of *ad hoc* deployment of special envoys in identified conflict areas on the continent, with the support from the Conflict Management Directorate of the Commission (ACCORD 2009, 10).

The Panel of the Wise

The creation of the PW was motivated by the need for finding homegrown solutions to African challenges, and by the African cultural belief of the wisdom, discretion and trustworthiness of elders. Practices from different parts of Africa exemplify these characteristics of senior leaders as relevant to conflict prevention and the maintenance of peace in indigenous settings.[27] In effect, it seems that the PW is operating

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[26]Through the PSC Secretariat.

[27]There are innumerous proverbs in all African regions espousing the wisdom of elders. "The Ikwerre people from the Niger Delta area in Nigeria say, "What an old man sees seated, a youth does not see standing." A similar expression is found in an East African proverb, "What old people see seated at the base of the tree young people cannot see from the branches." The Loa people of Congo have a proverb which states that "Those who do not listen to the voice of the elderly are like trees without roots" (ACCORD 2009, 21).

in a "contemporary setting as the functional equivalent of a cultural council of indigenous leaders tasked with intervening and resolving disputes" (Murithi and Mwaura 2010, 79). Within this cultural framework, similar structures are being developed in the RECs.

As presented in chapter 2, the PW can diplomatically intervene in crises through several ways. It can be by facilitating the establishment of channels of communication between the AU and parties engaged in a dispute; by carrying out fact-finding missions; by conducting shuttle diplomacy between parties; by encouraging parties to engage in political dialogue; carrying out reconciliation processes; or by assisting and advising mediation processes. The PW selects up to three critical crisis situations per year, which it will monitor constantly (Abdellaoui 2009, 6). The PW adopted five criteria for engaging in crisis situations, including:

> (1) The degree to which a conflict situation already receives regional and international attention or not. Conflicts that have been neglected for lack of resources or other reason may be especially appropriate cases for the PW to engage with;
> (2) Whether the PSC is already seized with a particular conflict situation and whether additional attention by the PW may add further value to existing efforts;
> (3) Whether a given situation has remained in conflict for a considerable amount of time or in danger of descending into conflict, despite multiple mediation and negotiation efforts. In such situations, the Panel may advise and strengthen existing efforts, inject new urgency to mediation processes, or take a fresh look at the conflict dynamics at play;
> (4) Whether a conflict situation has experienced a sudden and speedy decline;
> (5) Whether a conflict situation has experienced difficulties in implementing a peace agreement and, therefore faces the risk of reverting to conflict. (Abdellaoui 2009, 6)

The PW became operational in December 2007, and has met ten times since then. It is expected to meet at least three times a year, or more often if necessary. So far, its meetings have focused on three themes: election related conflicts; non-impunity, justice

and national reconciliation; and women and children in armed conflicts in Africa (AU 2010a, 56).

The PW has undertaken fruitful and important tasks in preventive diplomacy. Through confidence-building missions, the PW has engaged with countries and regions affected by crisis or conflicts, such as in Central African Republic (CAR) in 2007, and prior to South African elections in 2009 (AU 2010a, 56). It also has focused in West Africa, Southern Africa and the Horn region, undertaking a number of assessments and fact-finding missions in Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Somalia and Darfur (AU 2010a, 56).

However, the PW faces some constraints and challenges. The PW does not appear in the structure of the Commission raising budgetary, ownership and sustainable issues; therefore, it does not receive any funding through the AU regular budget. All its activities and those of its Secretariat have been funded through partner support, which is an unsustainable situation and hampers its activities (AU 2010a, 56). According to Murithi and Mwaura, the PW also needs staff complement,[28] namely a robust mediation support unit within the Commission and significant input from qualified political officers who have experience in bilateral and multilateral negotiation settings. "Without such a staff complement it will be difficult for the Panel to conduct its affairs of analyzing and

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[28]The Panel's Secretariat has only two professional staff and an administrative assistant for its eleven core functions, including: "collect and analyze information on developments on the continent and the priority countries and region the Panel may choose to focus on; conduct research and contribute substantive knowledge on conflict prevention, peace-making and mediation; facilitate the Panel's outreach efforts to civil society, research and academic institutions, and other relevant organizations; and contribute expertise and support to the Panel's efforts to raise debate on specific issues relating to the promotion of peace and security in Africa" (AU 2010, 57).

mapping conflicts and determining who the key parties, secondary actors and spoilers are in a given situation" (2010, 82).

The PW faces also some challenges. First, the importance of ensuring buy-in from the rest of the APSA mechanisms as well as AU Member States; this is vital for recognizing the importance of its role and therefore for its efficacy. Second, the importance of ensuring comprehensive coordination; without it there is a danger that the activities of the PW will be routinely undermined. Third, the clarification of which stage of the diplomatic process it intervenes and whether the PW will be empowered and appropriately staffed by the AU and its partners to fulfill its mandate effectively. "A pragmatic appreciation of the nexus between preventing conflicts, making peace once conflicts have escalated, and keeping peace following agreements will determine how effective the PW will be" (Murithi and Mwaura 2010, 90).

It seems that the PW has the potential to be the most innovative and effective diplomatic Means of the APSA. Not only because was conceived within the cultural framework of the African continent, but also because it is not (or should not be) constrained by the political considerations of the Commission or the PSC.

The Military Ways and Means

The Protocol that created the PSC establishes in Article 13 (African Standby Force) two primary generic military ways to achieve the strategic security goals: peace support missions and military intervention. These two primary ways are divided in seven possible methods, or areas:

    (1) observation and monitoring missions;
    (2) other types of peace support missions;
    (3) intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the

request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act;
(4) preventive deployment in order to prevent (i) a dispute or a conflict from escalating, (ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighboring areas or States, and (iii) the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement;
(5) peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization;
(6) humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters;
(7) any other functions as may be mandated by the PSC or the Assembly. (AU 2020, 19)

These several ways are primarily focused on the internal threats: inter-state conflicts/tensions; intra-state conflicts/tensions; unstable post-conflict situations; and grave humanitarian situations. It is important to note that in any relevant strategic document of the APSA[29] are defined military ways of dealing with external threats, such as terrorism or cross-border crimes. This is corroborated by the existing scenarios for employing the ASF (presented in chapter 2), ranging from small-scale observation missions to forcible military intervention. These six scenarios focus on peace support operations and do not authorize the ASF to engage with external threats or other security challenges, such as those associated with antipiracy and maritime security. This land-focused approach can be too narrow for addressing all the dimensions of a complex peace-support operation, as the case of Libya demonstrated.

In addition, the participation in humanitarian assistance or in efforts to address major natural disasters is not envisioned in the six scenarios of the ASF. Generally, military organizations possess important capabilities--such as transport, logistics and the ability to deploy rapidly--to participate in disaster relief operations. The *Solemn*

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[29]Such as the Protocol that creates the PSC or the *Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defense and Security Policy*.

Declaration on a Common African Defense and Security Policy mentions that the ASF

"shall provide humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population

in conflict areas (as well as support efforts to address major natural disasters)" (AU 2004,

18). However, this intention was not translated into the existing scenarios of the ASF.

So far, the AU has tended to concentrate its military responses on conflict

management, rather conflict prevention, through peacekeeping and peace enforcement

operations. The AU authorized military missions in Burundi, Sudan/Darfur, Somalia and

Comoros.[30] Military operations have been deployed to "supervise, observe, monitor, and

verify the implementation of ceasefire agreements or to help broke cease-fires between

government and rebel groups" (Söderbaum and Hettne 2010, 22).

Military intervention is a critical issue that is addressed in the APSA. According

to its Constitutive Act, the AU has "the right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to

decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances: namely war crimes, genocide

and crimes against humanity" (AU 2002a). Scenario 6 for the employment of the ASF

addresses these situations, namely "in genocide situations where the international

community does not act promptly" (AU 2005b, 3). Despite some legal doubts about this

right to intervene[31] (beyond the scope of this thesis) what is critical in this issue is the

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[30]As indicated on the AU's Web site: AMIB (African Mission in Burundi) from 3 February 2003 to 1 June 2004; AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan) from 28May 2004 to 31 December 2007; MUASEC (Mission de l'Union Africaine pour le Soutien aux Élections aux comores) from 21 March 2006 to 9 June 2006; MAES (African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros) from 13 Mai 2007 to October 2009; AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) from 1 March 2007 to present (ongoing); UNAMID (African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur) from 31 July to present (ongoing).

[31]Some legal issues can include: Is it "right" or "responsibility" to intervene? Can the AU intervene without the consent of the UN Security Council, namely when "the international community does not act promptly" (scenario 6)?

political will to apply this very coercive military measure when it becomes imperative. This is true for the AU and for all other organizations, like the UN Security Council, that need to deal with similar, and always sensitive, situations of intervention. As mentioned by Stephen Burgess, US Air War College, political will is "lacking in Africa, as has been demonstrated by the cases of Rwanda, Darfur and Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the ASF goal of stopping genocide provides the United States, Britain and France (with the most capable militaries) the excuse not to act (as was the case with Darfur). If the United States and Britain had intervened in Darfur in 2004 as initially promised, the entire ASF concept would look quite different" (2009, 6).

The African Standby Force

The African Standby Force is the primary military instrument for implementing the decisions of the PSC. It is based on standby arrangements with the continent's five sub-regions, each providing a brigade-sized contribution, supported by civilian police and other capacities. According to a recent assessment report of the AU, released in 2010, "there is no doubt that efforts to operationalize the ASF have registered good progress although, the degree of progress varies from region to regions" (2010a, 51).

As presented on chapter 2, it was envisaged that, by the year 2010, the AU would have developed the capacity to manage up to Scenario 5 (complex peacekeeping operations). It matters for the purposes of this thesis to analyze the last developments of the ASF. In March 2008, African military leaders reviewed the progress made operationalizing the ASF and adopted policy documents on doctrine, standard operating procedures (SOP), logistics, training and evaluation, and C3IS (Command, Control,

Communication and Information Systems) (AU 2010b, 2). A second Roadmap,[32] adopted

in July 2008, set out a "considerable burden of the task to be accomplished over the next

two years" (Bachmann 2011, 15). Those tasks focused on the development of policy

issues,[33] component development (in particular, the Peace Support Operations Division

(PSOD) and the police and civilian components), and training (AU 2010b, 3). In April

2010 a concept of *Rapid Deployment Capability* (RDC)[34] for the ASF was finalized,

which is expected to be operational, and evaluated through a training event by the end of

2012 (AU 2010b, 3).

A major exercise to validate the AU processes for employing the ASF was

conducted in 2010. The AMANI exercise consisted of four main activities: (1) a strategic

decision maker's seminar; (2) a map exercise (MAPEX); (3) a political strategic

seminar/conference; (4) and a command-post exercise (CPX) (AU 2010b, 7). The key

findings of the first impressions report were:

> (1) The overall concept of the ASF should be reconfirmed at this stage so a
> Review is proposed that will look at, inter alia, the ASF scenarios, the role of the
> Military Staff Committee (MSC), the role of the African Peace Support Training
> Association (APSTA), the MOU between AU and RECs/RMs, and the ASF
> Vision;
> (2) The RECs/RMs are able to deliver a multidimensional capability for use on

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[32]The first roadmap for the operationalization of the ASF was adopted in March 2005.

[33]Such as the "Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC), Formed police Unit (FPUs),
Logistic Policy, Medical Policy, Protection of Civilians, and Strategic Lift" (AU 2010b, 2)

[34]The RDC concept, now placed upfront in the list of priorities for the ASF, is based on
"nominating two regional RDC components (about 2,500 strong) on standby at any one time to be
available to deploy within 14 days when mandated to do so by the AU Assembly in response to a
Scenario 6 situation (genocide, gross abuse of human rights) or in response to a request from a
Member State, or in response to a request to support agencies managing a national, regional or
global response to a natural or humanitarian disaster. Logistics, communications, procedures and
planning form the key enablers for the RDC concept, all of which need to be enhanced if the
RDC Concept is to be realized (AU 2010b, 3)

AU Missions albeit with some shortages, especially with regard to police and civilians;
(3) AU Commission procedures for decision taking and integrated mission planning have weaknesses that should be addressed, hence the importance of follow-on work on the Aide-Memoire.
(4) Major weaknesses remain in the AUC structures for planning, launching, managing and sustaining AU missions, mainly on the civilian support side and on operational and financial procedures.
(5) The lack of a continental CIS infrastructure and of a continental logistic arrangement undermines the ASF's operational capability. (AU 2010b, 8)

These findings allow the general conclusion that, despite achieving major progress developing the ASF, there are still significant shortcomings. Bachmann analyzed and summarized some of these shortcomings: the AU and the regions lack mission planning capacity; the police and civilian components of the ASF remain significantly weaker than their military counterparts; communications and interoperability between military, police, and civilians in the field remain low; administrative, financial and human resources management capacity remain too weak compared to the task at hand; African missions remain heavily dependent on external support for the entire range of their logistics needs, from strategic deployment to field logistics, as well as for their CIS (communications and information systems) needs. "Financial dependence on external donors characterizes African capacity-building efforts as well as operations" (Bachmann 2011, 13).

The AU and the sub-regions have made significant progress towards establishing a viable regional peace support capability. However, the progress and status of readiness of each of the regional brigades is different (see table 5).

Table 5. Progress and status of readiness of each of the regional brigades					
	EASBRIG (East Africa)	**FOMAC** (Central Africa)	**ECOBRIG** (West Africa)	**NASBRIG** (North Africa)	**SADCBRIG** (South Africa)
Framework documents	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
MoU with AU	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
Planning Elements	✔	✔	✔	**Ongoing**	✔
Brigade HQs	✔	**Decided against***	✔	**Ongoing**	**Decided against***
Pledged Units	MoU on troop allocation pending; 5500 troops pledged by Member Sates	MoU pending; "force catalog" of 4800 troops presenting by Member Sates	MoU pending; 6200 unspecified troops pledged by Member Sates	MoU pending	MoU pending; unspecified troops pledged by Member Sates
Civilian Components	**Ongoing**	**Ongoing**	**Ongoing**	**Ongoing**	**Ongoing**
Centers of Excellence	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
Logistic Depots	✘	✘	✘	✘	✘
* - FOMAC and SADCBRIG decided not to have Brigade HQ as it was deemed to result in unnecessary cost.					

Source: Created by author, Adapted from AU, *Progress Report on the Status of the Operationalization of the African Standby Force*, 2010, http://www.acoc-africa.org/docs/Dec2010ProgRepASF.pdf (assessed November 3, 2011), 40; Olaf Bachmann, *The African Standby Force: External Support to an 'African Solution to African Problems'?*, 2011, http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Rr67web.pdf (assessed October 30, 2011), 31.

Despite the focus for this thesis is the continental level, the analysis of this table suggests some comments and deductions at the regional level. The efforts to operationalize the ASF has registered good progress although, the degree of progress varies from region to region. It seems that the NASBRIG is lagging in the operationalization of the standby arrangement, despite NARC's economic and military potential of its members. This is due to the fact there was no prior collaboration among the North African States at this level. Hence, they had to create all these structures to

meet the requirements of the ASF (Alghali and Mbaye 2008, 38). In addition, the

progress has been hampered by a "lack of multilateral cooperation in the region,

exemplified by the Algerian-Moroccan standoff over Western Sahara" (Burgess 2009, 3)

and by the recent events in Libya.

Logistics depots are important and a basic mission capability needed for the ASF.

Recently, the AU and RECs launched projects focused on improving the shortcomings of

logistics depots. This effort, however, "does not seem to have gone much beyond studies

to identify the appropriate locations of the depots and initial drafts of their contents and

costs"[35] (Bachmann 2011, 13).

Another finding from table 5 is the civilian components (including police) are still

underdeveloped in all sub-regions. The civilian components are essential for addressing

multidimensional peacekeeping and peace-building operations. Still, according to the

AU, "these components have been put in place in all sub-regions but there are still some

crucial gaps" (AU 2010b, 51).

To date, none of the RECs and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) have signed a formal

MoU with their Members for the deployment of their troops. This aspect is fundamental

for the operationalization and employment of the ASF, requiring that the AU, RECs and

RMs adopt binding legal documents with Member States for the employment of pledged

troops.

The gap between aspiration and implementation remains wide. Protocols and

framework documents are in place, and institutional structures are being built; but despite

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[35]Following protracted studies and political discussions, the decision to create a
continental depot in Douala, Cameroon, was finally approved by the defense and security
ministers in December 2010 (Bachmann 2011, 40).

recent developments, operational capacity remains limited in the face of rising demands

and expectations (Cilliers 2005, 16). In December 2010, a third roadmap was proposed

by an AU specialized technical committee to focus on the steps needed to reach Full

Operating Capability (FOC) for a limited Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) by 2012,

and FOC for the ASF as a whole by 2015 (AU 2010b, 1). These are ambitious objectives.

In order to achieve them, the AU and the ASF need to overcome important shortfalls and

vital challenges. As the AMANI Exercise indicated, there are shortfalls in the areas of

coordination, force composition; planning; doctrine, procedures and training;

interoperability and communications; and logistics (AU 2010b, 1). Some of these

deficiencies will need better management of administrative and human resources to

improve; however, the greatest resource shortfall remains internal financial contributions

and dependence on external donors.

Therefore, two big challenges emerge: the first one is related to balance. Military

operations, equipment and logistics are expensive. African leaders need to find a balance

between investing in this continental and regional security mechanism and in the

immediate challenges of governance, poverty, and development. Both dimensions are not

mutually exclusive as there is no development without security.

The biggest challenge is African will and ownership. If the AU Member States

really want to develop African solutions for African security problems, they need to be

more pro-active and innovative. The cultural paradigm, *we do it this way, because that's*

the way we do it, often inhibits appropriate and effective responses to challenges. As

Cilliers pointed out, sometimes Africans "deliberately take a back seat, engaging in an

old game of extracting the maximum benefit from their benefactors" (Cilliers 2008, 18).

This logically will lead to more external engagement and to less African commitment, hindering African progress and development, and therefore, African solutions. Undoubtedly, African need vast financial and technical support from donors and partners; but it is vital that the "AU and the various regions ensure that they assume ownership and drive donor support and not the other way around" (Cilliers 2008, 18).

<div style="text-align: center;">The Informational Ways and Means</div>

Generally, the purposes of the informational Ways are disseminating and collecting information in order to achieve strategic objectives (Worley 2008, 4). The protocol that created the PSC establishes that, in order to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa, the information gathered through the CEWS shall be used by the Chairperson of the Commission to "advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action" (AU 2002b, 17).

Early warning systems have specific characteristics, which are different from national intelligence systems. The *Forum on Early Warning and Early Response* (FEWER), defined (political) early warning as the "collection and analysis of information about potential and actual conflict situations, and the provision of policy options to influential actors at the national, regional and international levels that may promote sustainable peace" (Schnabel and Krummenacher 2009, 3). Early warning systems use open source information, are focused on conflict prevention, aim to serve human security--not national or State interests--and tend to be decentralized and dependent upon the involvement of sections of civil society for information input and analysis (Cilliers 2005, 1). Unlike risk assessment, early warning systems must be designed to anticipate

rather than predict possible outcomes, enabling the responsible authority to initiate

informed, reasonable response strategies (Cilliers 2005, 2).

In a basic form, conflict early warning needs to tackle:

(a) Which issues (manifestations, precipitating, proximate and root causes) underpin and drive the conflict?
(b) Which factors put a brake on conflict and serve as the basis for peace?
(c) Who are the main stakeholders in the conflict?
(d) What are the practical options available to policy-makers who wish to affect the emerging conflict, avoid human suffering in the short term and move toward a sustainable settlement in the longer term?
(e) The timely communication and engagement with policy-makers - to close the loop from analysis to action. (Cilliers 2006, 2)

As presented in chapter 2, the AU CEWS was conceived to answer these

questions and has all characteristics mentioned before. It focuses on conflict prevention

(AU 2002b, 4). The development of the CEWS has been achieved by a collaborative

effort with a wide variety of stakeholders in Africa and elsewhere (AU 2008c, 3). It is

directly linked with the concept of human security (AU 2004, 3). Moreover, it is an open-

source system where data is compiled from different sources, including governmental and

inter-governmental actors, international and non-governmental organizations, the media,

academia and think thanks (AU 2008b, 4). In fact, as mentioned by Cilliers, this last

characteristic makes early warning systems appealing to intergovernmental organizations,

such as the AU, "that would have great difficulty in accessing (or using) state intelligence

from one member country vis-à-vis another member country" (Cilliers 2005, 1).

The AU Informational Way--materialized by the CEWS--to achieve the AU Ends

is focused on the internal threats, at least theoretically, namely on inter-state

conflicts/tensions and intra-state conflicts/tensions. The Indicators Module of the CEWS,

which trigger the early warning cycle (and provides the information for the strategic

analysis and the engagement with decision-makers), is based on a framework of generic

indicators derived *ex negativo* from documents adopted by the African Heads of State

and Government (AU 2008d, 6). All those documents are directly related with conflict

prevention, human rights, good governance and democracy. No indicators were

developed for external threats, such as terrorism or cross-border crimes.

Despite the nature and purpose of the CEWS, there are always sensitive issues

when using information related with events that occurred inside a Member State. The

Director of Peace and Security at the AU, Ambassador Sam Ibok, mentioned some of

them, including: the barrier of national sovereignty, which often hampered efforts to

collect reliable data and information, as well as timely intervention; the issue of data

ownership, which often created problems on the flexibility of the use and dissemination

of data collected; and the lack of political will on the part of Member States (Cilliers

2005, 19). These issues are critical and must be openly addressed by the AU, if the goal is

effectively mitigate internal and external threats.

The Continental Early Warning System

As presented in previous chapters, the CEWS is one of the key instruments of the

APSA. A recent assessment report indicated that significant progress has been achieved

in the operationalization of the CEWS, and the system has been able to "provide reliable

and up-to-date information on potential, actual and post-conflict situations" (AU 2010b,

32). Some important outputs and achievements include:

- Successful development of the CEWS methodology through a consultative
process with all involved stakeholders;
- Development of data collection and analysis tools and the elaboration of a
software licensing agreement between CEWS and the early warning systems of
the RECs;

- Strengthened coordination and collaboration between CEWS and the early warning systems of the RECs;
- Refurbishment of the Situation Room. Infrastructure upgrade and installment of the necessary equipments, including the live monitoring software;
- Increased expertise and analytical skills of the CEWS and the early warning systems of most RECs. This includes putting in place some Early Warning Officers, Analysts and Situation Room staff;
- Information collection and monitoring tools are operational and data can be accessed through a specifically developed CEWS information portal. (AU 2010b, 32)

However, the same report mentioned before identifies important shortfalls. The level of development of each of the sub-regional early warning systems is different, hindering higher level operation. Data collection and reporting are relatively advanced at the continental level, in ECOWAS and in IGAD, but not yet effective in CEN-SAD, EAC and COMESA; in most other RECs, progress has been achieved in establishing policy frameworks, specific concepts and approaches to early warning (AU 2010b, 33). Conflict analysis and development of response options are just beginning in some regions; only IGAD is building up an integrated response mechanism at this stage (AU 2010b, 33). There are still technical and financial constraints to directly link each of the RECs monitoring and observation centers to the AU Situation Room (AU 2010b, 34). There is a shortage of staff in the AU Situation room[36] and within the early warning systems of the RECs. It is also necessary to enhance the analytic capacity of staff. "Without substantial staff reinforcement it is questionable whether the monitoring units in certain RECs will be established" (AU 2010b, 34).

Efforts to strengthen engagement with senior management and political decision makers in some of the RECs remain embryonic (AU 2010b, 35). Coordination and

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[36]There are ten Situation Room assistants working on a 24/7 shift basis (AU 2010b, 34).

collaboration with relevant international organizations to build functional and result-oriented partnerships is needed (AU 2010b, 35). The AU has not been able to engage with civil society organizations (CSO) because of the diversity of civil society and the very different level of development in different States and regions (AU 2010b, 36). Different kinds of support for the CEWS were drawn from a relatively small number of donors.[37] In general, donor support has been forthcoming with adequate timing and at sufficient levels. However, "most partners tend to prioritize one or two organizations rather than continent-wide CEWS support based on a pragmatic approach which match the advancement of the individual organizations" (AU 2010b, 36).

All these issues are important and need to be adequately addressed. Some of them are structural, such as the liaison and coordination between the AU and the RECs, and the human, technical and financial sustainability of the system. The ability of the CEWS to engage AU decision-makers appropriately and influence decision-making is the most critical issue. This is also its central role, which ultimately will enable the development of appropriate response strategies by the AU. Also imperative, however, is the capability to develop effective outreach strategies to engage other stakeholders outside the AU. The CEWS is an open source system and, by its nature, it is desirable to remain as such. Without this vital link with civil society--including non-governmental organizations, media, academia and think thanks--the flow of information will be limited and partial, hindering its primary purpose of facilitating timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.

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[37]"Programmed/budget funding is provided by EU, UNDP, GTZ, and DANIDA. Flexible, ad-hoc funding is also provided by UNDP, UK, GTZ, and USAID" (2010b, 35).

The Economic Ways and Means

Usually, in the realm of strategic theory, the economic ways[38] are associated with tariffs and quotas, economic sanctions, incentives and foreign economic aid, with the purposes of protection or coercion, but also providing a basis for developing other instruments of power or influence (Worley 2008, 6).

The AU can impose economic sanctions under certain conditions. Article 23 of the AU Constitutive Act establishes that any Member State that fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the AU may be subjected to sanctions, "such as the denial of transport and communications links with other Member States, and other measures of a political and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly" (AU 2002a, 12). Rule 37 of the *Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Union* add that economic sanctions may be applied against regimes that refuse to restore constitutional order, such as trade restrictions and any additional sanction as may be recommended by the PSC (AU 2002c).

The AU sanctions regime addresses three main types of situations: nonpayment of membership contributions (arrears), non-compliance with the decisions and policies of the AU, and unconstitutional changes of government (AU 2002c). All these situations include economic sanctions ranging from provision, by the AU, of funds for new projects in Member States to trade restrictions. In the last few years, the AU applied sanctions to some Member States. The AU PSC has issued a series of sanctions against Togo, the

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[38]In this study, the economic ways are analyzed in classic strategic terms, more related with threats and security to Africa. Other economic ways are being developed by the AU aiming Africa's development and integration, but they are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, as mentioned in the AU Strategic Plan 2009-2012, achieving the necessary continental security and stability is a prerequisite for Africa's development and integration (AU 2009c, 7).

Comoros, Mauritania, and recently on Guinea, Niger and Madagascar,[39] however, with

mixed results in terms oversight, monitoring and the verification of implementation

(Lulie 2010).

In order to enhance AU capacity to ensure Member States implement what they

bargained for the AU decided to create a *Sanctions Committee* within the PSC. The

committee will have an important role in recommending to the PSC, AU and other

legitimate bodies the actions deemed appropriate in response to violations, and in lifting

or hardening sanctions (Lulie 2010).

Economic sanctions may have an important role in addressing some of internal

threats to Africa. However, it is questionable if the AU has the full capacity to effectively

impose these sanctions. As mentioned in a recent report of the Chairperson of

Commission "over and above the suspension measure, international partners, particularly

the UNSC, should lend more effective support to the sanctions decided by the AU" (AU

2010, 6). This international support is a fundamental condition. Still, two other conditions

are needed. "The first one is technical which includes the design and the infrastructure of

the management of implementation. The second condition is political or related to the

will to act quickly, evenhandedly and consistently" (ISS 2009, 2).

The Peace Fund

It is imperative to stress that the Peace Fund is not an economic instrument to be

used on realm of economic sanctions or other punitive measures. As presented in chapter

2, its role is to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and

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[39]In the case of Madagascar the economic sanctions included: the freezing of funds, other financial assets and economic resources (AU 2010c, 2).

other operational activities related to peace and security in Africa. However, it has an economic[40] (financial) nature and, above all, is one of the instruments of the APSA, contributing for achieving its peace and security objectives.

The Peace Fund is the continental mechanism created by the AU to financially support the APSA. It is made up of financial appropriations from four sources: regular budget of the AU, voluntary contributions by Member States, non-Member States contributions and miscellaneous receipts (AU 2007, 102). With regard to the contribution from the AU Member States, only 12 percent[41] of its annual budget is allocated to the fund (AU 2010b, 60).

However, the Peace Fund is virtually empty and "there is cause for concern regarding the funding of peace operations in Africa" (AU 2007, 102). Some Member States have difficulties in honoring their financial obligations, and by 2009 the AU's Peace Fund had a negative balance (AU 2010b, 60). Between 2004 and 2007, only 1.9 percent of the total resources channeled through the Peace Fund came from African Member States; the rest was provided by external partners (AU2010b, 59). The EU is so far the largest funding partner of the AU (Gänzle and Grimm 2010, 75).

A high-level audit of the African Union in 2007 recommended that the Commission Chairperson should intensify his efforts at mobilizing funds and resources for AU peacekeeping operations from within the Continent and the Diaspora. In addition, the report stressed the need of the African countries to contribute substantially to AU

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[40]This is the reason why it is methodologically analyzed under the economic ways.

[41]In 2010, a UN report mentioned that these contributions would not be sufficient to deploy and sustain the current peace support operations, and proposed its enhancement (UN 2010, 14).

peace operations and to pay regularly their respective contributions (AU 2007, 172). If

the Member States meet their financial obligations, the AU's dependency on external aid

will be reduced, and that sustainability and ownership of the APSA will be guaranteed

(AU 2010b, 60).

<center>Summary of Deductions in Terms of
Suitability and Feasibility</center>

The methodology expressed in chapter 3, presented the evaluation criteria of the

APSA in terms of three major points: development stage, suitability and feasibility.

Development stage is related with milestones and/or performance; suitability is related to

the Ends (will its attainment accomplish the effect desired?); and feasibility is relates to

the Ways and Means (can the action be accomplished by the Means available?) The

development stage of each of the components of the APSA was addressed previously in

chapter 4, with substantial level of depth. Chapter 4 also addressed the suitability and

feasibility of several the Ways and Means of the APSA. This section summarizes the

major strategic deductions in terms of suitability of the Ends and feasibility of the Ways

and Means of the APSA.

<center>Suitability</center>

The Ends established for the APSA in the CADSP are generally coherent with the

desired effect of promoting and consolidating peace and security on the continent. The

objectives of the CADSP for the APSA are essentially to respond effectively to both

internal and external threats to Africa.

The threats identified by the CADSP are numerous and extremely diverse (in its

nature, capabilities or intentions) making it very complex and challenging to find

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balanced Ways and Means to mitigate all of these threats. In addition, most of these threats are interconnected and affect the development, peace and security of the continent.

The CASDP does not specifically addresses maritime or cyber security threats. These two types of threats are also dangers to the security interests of the African continent, undermining the maintenance and promotion of security and stability.

The APSA provides a good framework for AU Member States to cooperate and develop close defense and security relationships. This framework may contribute to building an enhanced and suitable collective African peace and security system.

Feasibility

In a strategic realm, feasibility assesses the extent in which the Ways--diplomatic, military, informational and economic--can be accomplished by its Means.

The Protocol that created the PSC establishes two primary diplomatic Ways to achieve the APSA strategic goals: preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. The findings of this research study allow the overall assumption that the two diplomatic Ways are feasible. They can be accomplished by its respective Means, despite the restrictions, shortcomings and challenges presented for the PSC, Commission and PW. However, some enhancements are still required and the efforts of the three Means should be better coordinated and integrated for a more effective outcome.

The Protocol that created the PSC establishes two primary generic military Ways to achieve the strategic goals: peace support missions and military interventions. The findings of this research study allow the overall assumption that the two military Ways are feasible. They can be accomplished by its primary Means, despite the significant

shortcomings and challenges presented for the ASF. However, the military Ways do not address all the threats to APSA and important enhancements are required for the ASF, mainly at the regional level. Without effective regional Brigades, there will be no ASF.

The informational Way established for the APSA is based in an early warning system. This type of system uses open source information, is focused on conflict prevention, aims to serve human security (not national or State interests), and tends to be decentralized and dependent upon the involvement of sections of civil society for information input and analysis. The findings of this research study allow the overall assumption that the informational Way is feasible. As it was conceived, as an early warning system, it can be accomplished by its primary Means, despite the shortcomings and challenges of the CEWS. However, the informational Way does not address all the threats to APSA as it only addresses the internal threats. Important CEWS enhancements are required, particularly at the regional level, and better engagement with decision-makers and civil society.

The Economic Ways established for the APSA are based in economic sanctions such as trade restrictions, the denial of transport and communications links with other Member States, or provision (by the AU) of funds for new projects in Member States. The findings of this research study allow the overall assumption that the economic Way is feasible, but it will require the institutionalization of the *Sanctions Committee*, political will, a bureaucratic infrastructure to manage the implementation of sanctions, and the support of international partners and donors. External financial and political support is essential to increase and sustain the Peace Fund and to implement economic and other sanctions.

To sum up, the four Ways established for the APSA are feasible, and they can be accomplished by its Means. However, its effectiveness is dependent on three critical ingredients: political will of AU Member States, developments at the regional level, and by addressing the external threats much more consistently, ensuring the security dimension of the APSA is developed to the same extent as its peace dimension.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study is a descriptive study in the realm of strategy, focused on creating a holistic and meaningful picture about the mechanisms and purpose of the APSA. The overall intent of this study was to analyze the mechanisms developed, or in a developing stage, by the AU and regional organizations to address peace and security issues in the African continent, with the ultimate goal of contributing to a better understanding of African security context at the strategic level. This thesis tried to answer the primary question: To what extent is the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) a viable security strategy to deal with the principal threats in Africa? The primary and secondary questions drove this academic study, providing useful lines of research. These lines were followed systematically presenting enormous quantity of updated and significant data about the APSA. This data was analyzed using the strategic model Ends-Ways-Means, an adequate methodology to understand strategic contexts. This last chapter presents major conclusions and some recommendations, closing this research cycle and simultaneously opening new lines of research for the future.

Conclusions

In order to maintain coherence with the analysis methodology, these conclusions are organized in the same way, i.e., by the Ends, Ways, and Means established for the APSA.

The Ends of the APSA

The Ends established for the APSA in the CADSP are generally coherent with the desired effect of promoting and consolidating peace and security on the continent. The objectives of the CADSP for the APSA are essentially to respond effectively to both internal and external threats in relation to Africa. The internal threats are primarily focused on the peace dimension of the APSA and the external threats are mainly focused on the security dimensions of the APSA. Internal threats include inter-state, intra-state and post conflict situations. External threats refer to external challenges to the security of Africa, such as terrorism, mercenarism, or cross-border crimes.

The threats identified by the CADSP are numerous[42] and extremely diverse (in its nature, capabilities or intentions) making it very complex and challenging to find balanced Ways and Means to mitigate all of these threats. In addition, most of these threats are interconnected and affect the development, peace and security of the continent. In today's strategic context, in Africa or elsewhere, situations and problems such as terrorism, civil wars, organized crime or extreme poverty, are interrelated and cannot be addressed separately.

The CASDP does not specifically addresses maritime or cyber security threats. These two types of threats pose dangers to the security interests of the African continent, undermining the promotion of security and stability. As one can see in the Gulf of Aden or in the Gulf of Guinea, issues like illegal fishing, piracy, arms and drugs trade, oil bunkering or sea pollution, are extremely dangerous threats that require strategic

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[42]The CASDP identifies thirty-one (31) different threats to the common defense and security interests.

mitigation. Likewise, cyber security threats have an enormous destabilizing potential. The low cost and virtual nature of cyber space makes it an attractive domain for use by those who seek to use cyber space for malicious purposes. As Internet penetration rates increase across the African continent, so does the risk of cyber-attacks, which threatens the protection of financial information, personal data, and intellectual property.

Finally, the APSA provides a good framework for AU Member States to cooperate and develop defense and security cooperation relationships. The CASDP establishes a structure for the AU Member States to cooperate by training military personnel, developing military doctrine and building a collective security capacity. The framework provided by the APSA may contribute to developing cooperation and operational capabilities among African military institutions, thereby building an enhanced and suitable collective African peace and security system

The Ways and Means of the APSA

The APSA establishes diplomatic, military, informational and economic Ways to address the peace and security threats. The Ways and Means analyzed in this study are directly related by its nature: The diplomatic Way with the PSC, the Commission, and the Panel of the Wise; The military Way with the African Standby Force; the informational Way with the Continental Early Warning System; and the economic way with the Peace Fund.

The Protocol that created the PSC establishes in Article 6 two primary diplomatic Ways to achieve the APSA strategic goals: preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. The comprehensive and coherent use of preventive diplomacy is important in creating the conditions for sustainable peace and, therefore, to address the peace and security

challenges in Africa. Peacemaking is based on the use of diplomatic methods, mainly

mediation, good offices, conciliation and enquiry. From these four methods, the

mediation process has often been employed in attempts to resolve conflicts on the

African continent. However, the AU still needs to move beyond ad hoc mediation

initiatives to an institutionalized and systematic process, thereby enhancing the

effectiveness mediation.

The diplomatic Ways of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking are

accomplished through the PSC, the Commission, and the PW, which are the primary

diplomatic Means of the APSA. The PSC is the AU standing decision-making organ for

security issues, and it is empowered to take diplomatic initiatives and action it deems

appropriate with regard to situations of potential and actual conflicts. However, the PSC

has important capacity constraints, namely human and material, and some lack of

political will, reflecting the power politics and interests in Africa. Additionally, under the

authority of the PSC, and in consultation with all parties involved in a conflict, the

Chairperson of the Commission may take all diplomatic initiatives deemed appropriate to

prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. Furthermore, the PW can diplomatically intervene

in crises by conducting shuttle diplomacy between parties or by assisting and advising

mediation processes. So far, the PW has undertaken fruitful and important tasks in

preventive diplomacy, but it still faces substantial constraints and challenges. Some

constraints include budgetary and staff limitations, depending entirely on the

Commission for administrative, logistic, and technical support. The major challenges the

PW faces are clarification at which stage of the diplomatic process the PW will be

authorized to intervene and whether the PW will be empowered and appropriately staffed

by the AU and its partners to effectively fulfill its mandate. However, it seems that the PW has the potential to be the most innovative and effective diplomatic Means of the APSA. Not only because the PW was conceived within the cultural framework of the African continent, but also because it is not (or should not be) constrained by the political considerations of the Commission and the PSC.

These findings allow the conclusion that the two diplomatic Ways are feasible. They can be accomplished by its respective Means, despite the restrictions, shortcomings and challenges presented for the PSC, Commission and PW. However, some enhancements are still required and the efforts of the three Means should be coordinated or integrated for a more effective outcome.

The Protocol that created the PSC establishes two primary generic military Ways to achieve the strategic goals: peace support missions and military interventions. These two Ways are primarily focused on the internal threats and address the peace dimension of the APSA; however, external threats, such as terrorism or cross-border crimes are not addressed and ignore the broader security dimension of the APSA. This is corroborated by the six existing scenarios for employing the ASF, which focus on peace support operations and military interventions, and do not authorize the ASF to conduct operations related to external threats or other security challenges, such as natural disasters, humanitarian crisis or transnational crime. So far, the AU authorized peace support missions in some African countries, but has yet to exercise its *right to intervene* by authorizing any military intervention operation. Despite some legal doubts about this *right to intervene*, the critical issue is the political will to apply this very coercive military measure when it becomes imperative. These two military Ways, peace support missions

and military interventions, are land-focused approaches, which can be too narrow for addressing all the dimensions of complex peace support operations that include the maritime and aerospace domains as recent events in Libya demonstrated. Additionally, by not utilizing important capabilities that militaries possess to participate in disaster relief operations, such as transport, logistics and the ability to deploy rapidly, a major gap is left unfilled.

The ASF is the military Means to accomplish the military Ways established in the APSA. Despite major progress developing the ASF, there are still significant shortcomings in some areas such as, mission planning capacity; police and civilian components; interoperability; doctrine; administrative, financial and human resources management; and in CIS and logistics.[43] In addition, the ASF does not have the proper force structure for participating in complex peacekeeping operations, such as air, naval or special forces components, which may limit its employment. Moreover, each of the regional brigades is at a different stage of development and readiness for deployment. The NASBRIG is lagging in the operationalization of the standby arrangement and, to date, none of the RECs and RMs have signed a formal MoU with their Members for the deployment of their troops. In December 2010, a new roadmap was proposed by the AU to focus on the steps needed to reach FOC for a limited Rapid Deployment Capability by 2012, and FOC for the ASF as a whole by 2015. These are ambitious objectives. In order to achieve them, the AU and the ASF need to overcome its important shortfalls and vital challenges. One big challenge is related to balance. Military operations, equipment and

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[43]CIS and logistics are two areas in which African missions remain heavily dependent on external support.

logistics are not cheap. African leaders need to find a balance between investing in this continental and regional security mechanism and in the immediate challenges of governance, poverty, and development. Both dimensions are not mutually exclusive as there is no development without security. However, the biggest challenge is African will and ownership. If the AU Member States really want to develop African solutions for African security problems, they need to be more pro-active and innovative. If Africans do not fully engage in this project, it will led to more external engagement and to less African commitment, hindering African progress and security, and therefore, African solutions.

These findings allow the conclusion that the two military Ways are feasible. They can be accomplished by its primary Means, despite the shortcomings and challenges presented for the ASF. However, the military Ways do not address all the threats to APSA and important enhancements are required for the ASF, mainly at the regional level. Without effective regional Brigades, there will be no ASF.

The informational Way established for the APSA is based in an early warning system. This type of system uses open source information, it is focused on conflict prevention, aims to serve human security (not national or State interests) and tends to be decentralized and dependent upon the involvement of sections of civil society for information input and analysis. The informational Way established for the APSA is focused on the internal threats--again, in the peace dimension of the APSA--and does not address the external threats--the security dimension. In addition, despite the nature and purpose of early warning systems, there are sensitive issues related to national sovereignty, data ownership and political will. These issues are critical and must be

openly addressed by the AU Members to effectively mitigate internal and external threats.

The CEWS is the informational Means to accomplish the informational Way established in the APSA. Significant progress has been achieved in the operationalization of the CEWS, and the system has been able to provide reliable and up-to-date information on potential, actual and post-conflict situations. However there are important shortfalls in some areas. These include the very different levels of development of each of the REC early warning systems, data collection and reporting, conflict analysis, response option development, technical and financial constraints, and staff and expertise shortages. All these shortfalls are important and need to be adequately addressed. Some of them are structural, such as the liaison and coordination between the AU and the RECs, and the human, technical and financial sustainability of the system. The two major challenges are the ability of the CEWS to engage and influence AU decision-makers; and the capability to develop effective outreach strategies to engage stakeholders outside the AU. The CEWS is an open source system and, by its nature, it is desirable to remain as such. Without this vital link with civil society--including non-governmental organizations, media, academia and think thanks--the flow of information will be limited, hindering its primary purpose of facilitating timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.

These findings allow the conclusion that the informational Way is feasible. As it was conceived--as an early warning system--it can be accomplished by its primary Means, despite the shortcomings and challenges presented for the CEWS. However, the informational Way does not address all the threats to APSA as it only addresses the

internal threats and important enhancements are required for the CEWS, particularly at the regional level, and well as improving interaction and information exchange with decision makers and civil society.

The Economic Ways established for the APSA are based in economic sanctions such as trade restrictions, the denial of transport and communications links with other Member States, or provision (by the AU) of funds for new projects in Member States. The AU sanctions regime addresses three main types of situations in which sanctions can be applied: nonpayment of membership contributions (arrears), non-compliance with the decisions and policies of the AU, and unconstitutional changes of government. Economic sanctions may have an important role in addressing some of internal threats. However, it is questionable if the AU has the full capacity to effectively impose these sanctions. It will need the support of international partners, an infrastructure to manage the implementation of sanctions, and primarily, political will.

In order to enhance AU capacity to ensure Member States implement what they bargained for, the AU created a *Sanctions Committee* within the PSC. This committee will make recommendations to the PSC, to the Commission, and other legitimate bodies concerning violations of sanctions, imposing additional sanctions, and when to lift sanctions. The Peace Fund is not an economic instrument to be used on realm of economic sanctions or other punitive measures. It is a continental mechanism and a key instrument of the APSA that is intended to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security in Africa. However, the Peace Fund is virtually empty because Member States have not

honored their financial obligations. Despite external support from donors, this financial gap may hinder the funding of peace operations in Africa.

The findings of this research study allow the overall assumption that the economic Way is feasible, but it will require the institutionalization of the Sanctions Committee, political will, a bureaucratic infrastructure to manage the implementation of sanctions, and the support of international partners and donors. External financial and political support is essential to increase and sustain the Peace Fund and to implement economic and other sanctions.

Military operations, equipment and logistics are expensive. African leaders need to find a balance between investing in this continental and regional security mechanism and in the immediate challenges of governance, poverty, and development. Both dimensions are not mutually exclusive as there is no development without security. This represents an enormous challenge to Africa requiring courage, will, wisdom and trust. As previously mentioned, the Ends of the ASPA are essentially to respond to both internal and external threats effectively. All these threats are often interrelated and cannot be addressed separately. In order to mitigate all these threats, comprehensive and integrated approaches are required, overcoming narrow preoccupations and working across the whole range of issues. Only by this way will the APSA be a viable security strategy to deal with the principal threats in Africa.

<u>Recommendations</u>

The main recommendations are based on three major potential gaps in the APSA, beside the lack of human, technical and financial resources: political will of AU Member States to implement the strategy; the discrepancies between the regional level and the

continental level; and the lack of Ways to address adequately the security dimension of the APSA, i.e., the external threats.

Political will is absolutely vital to operationalize all mechanisms of the APSA. Very sensitive issues such as military intervention in a Member State with regards to grave circumstances, information sharing, implementing sanctions or addressing transnational threats, require strong political commitment and will of AU Member States in order to be effective. Otherwise, the lack of political will can be exploited by the threats--internal or external--to discredit the AU and its Member States, thus hindering obtaining its strategic goals.

Another gap is the discrepancy between the regional and continental levels. The APSA is a very complex security system, relying on regional and continental intergovernmental organizations. At the continental level, there has been significant progress in the development of the AU organizational structures. However, most of the mechanisms of the APSA are completely dependent on the RECs and RMs, such as the regional brigades or the regional warning systems. Without the proper development and operationalization of these regional instruments, there will be no success for the APSA.

The other gap is the lack of Ways to address adequately the security dimension of the APSA. The African Peace and Security Architecture has, according to its name, two dimensions: peace and security. However, most of the Ways and Means of the APSA are primarily focused on the peace dimension of the APSA, not addressing effectively, or simply not addressing, the security dimension. Threats such as terrorism, mercenarism, cross-border crimes, cyber threats, or piracy require effective response strategies, both at the regional and continental levels. This will require cooperation between military,

security forces (i.e., police), civil society and external partners, but also the development of certain capabilities such as such as air, naval, special forces and cyber protection components, not present in the current structure.

These three issues are critical and will require African leaders' focus and also support and contribution of external partners. One significant contribution could be developing further research studies about possible ways to address each of these critical issues, principally the development of the security dimension of the APSA. Development of the security dimension will require comprehensive and innovative approaches, integrating African and external efforts. Research to aid in finding feasible Ways and Means to address African external threats, such as terrorism, cross-border crimes, cyber threats, or piracy, could contribute to fulfill this strategic gap, bringing balance and effectiveness to the APSA.

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Gary R. Hanson, M.B.A.
Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations
USACGSC
100 Stimson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

James B. Martin, Ph.D.
Department of Academics
USACGSC
100 Stimson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Michael J. Burke, M.Ed.
Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations
USACGSC
100 Stimson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301